Changing Research Perspectives on the Global Health Workforce by Till Bärnighausen & David Bloom
 
 
 PROGRAM ON THE GLOBAL 
  DEMOGRAPHY OF AGING 
   
 
 





Changing Research Perspectives on the  























The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Harvard 
Initiative for Global Health. The Program on the Global Demography of Aging receives funding from the 
National Institute on Aging, Grant No. 1 P30 AG024409-06. 












We thank Larry Rosenberg, Sherry A. Glied, and Peter C. Smith for valuable comments and Gaargi
Ramakrishnan for research support. A shorter version of this paper will appear as a chapter in P. Smith
& S. Glied (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Health Economics. New York: Oxford University Press (Bärnighausen
& Bloom, 2010 (forthcoming)). Changing Research Perspectives on the Global Health Workforce




Past research on the health workforce can be structured into three perspectives – “health workforce
planning” (1960 through 1970s); “the health worker as economic actor” (1980s through 1990s); and
“the health worker as necessary resource” (1990s through 2000s).  During the first phase, shortages
of health workers in developed countries triggered the development of four approaches to project future
health worker requirements. We discuss each approach and show that modified versions are experiencing
a resurgence in current studies estimating health worker requirements to meet population health goals,
such as the United Nations’ health-related Millennium Development Goals. A perceived “cost explosion”
in many health systems shifted the focus to the study of the effect of health workers’ behavior on health
system efficiency during the second phase.  We review the literature on one example topic: health
worker licensure. In the last phase, regional health worker shortages in developing countries and local
shortages in developed countries led to research on international health worker migration and programs
to increase the supply of health workers in underserved areas. Based on our review of existing studies,
we suggest areas for future research on the health workforce, including the transfer of existing approaches
from developed to developing countries.
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“People deliver health” (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004).  The health workforce, i.e., the 
people who are “primarily engaged in action with the primary intent of enhancing health” 
(WHO, 2006b), diagnose illnesses, heal, care for people, monitor health outcomes, support 
treatment adherence, provide medical information and prevent diseases.  The importance of 
health workers as decision makers and service providers in health systems is obvious.  It is 
matched by their impact on health spending.  WHO estimates that across countries worldwide 
about 50% of total public and private health expenditure (including capital costs) is spent on 
health worker wages, salaries and allowances (Hernandez, Dräger, Evans, Tan-Torres Edejer, 
& Dal Poz, 2006).
1  In addition, health workers are indirectly responsible for a large 
proportion of recurrent spending on health care through drug prescription, hospital 
admissions and other resource use in providing diagnostic, therapeutic and palliative services.   
In the following, we review the health economics and health systems literature on the health 
workforce.  We organize the review according to three perspectives on health workers, which 
correspond roughly to chronological phases of academic publication: health workforce 
planning (1960s and 1970s), the health worker as economic actor (1980s and 1990s), and the 
health worker as necessary resource (1990s and 2000s).   
A major research focus of studies on the health care workforce in the 1960s and 1970s was 
on models to predict future health staffing needs.  This research was triggered by shortages of 
specific types of health workers in developed countries and by reports from socialist 
countries that health manpower planning can aid health policy makers in ensuring an 
adequate supply of health workers.  Planning models developed in this phase continue to be 
applied today both in developed and developing countries.    
In the 1980s and 1990s, the research focus shifted to the study of health workers’ effect on 
allocative and technical efficiency in health systems.  Research in this phase was motivated 
by the perception of rising health expenditures in developed countries and the belief that 
health workers do not always act in their patients’ best interest.  Many of the important 
                                                            
1 Hernandez and colleagues identified data from 29 countries in Europe, 7 countries in the Americas, 4 countries 
in the Western Pacific region, 2 countries in Africa, and 1 country in the Eastern Mediterranean.  It is thus 
possible that the true average across all countries worldwide substantially differs from this estimate.  Saltman 
and Von Otter estimated that 65% to 80% of recurrent health expenditure is spent on health worker 
remuneration (Saltman & Von Otter, 1995); for Africa, Huddart and Picazo estimated this proportion to lie 
between 50% and 70% (Huddart & Picazo, 2003). 4 
 
research topics in this phase are covered in other chapters of the handbook, including agency 
(chapter 26), provider payment and incentives (chapter 27), competition among providers 
(chapter 29), performance and productivity (chapters 30 and 31), and medical decision-
making (chapter 33).  In this chapter, we review the literature on one research theme in this 
phase that is not discussed in detail elsewhere in this book (health worker licensure).  
Starting in the 1990s and continuing in this decade, health workers became increasingly 
viewed as a resource that is necessary to achieve population health goals.  In many 
geographical areas, health policies could not be implemented because health workers were 
lacking.  In developed countries, essential health care could not be delivered in rural and 
remote areas because the human resources for such delivery were not available.  In 
developing countries, it became apparent that population health goals – such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to “reduce child mortality”, “improve maternal 
health”, and “combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases” (United Nations, 2009) could 
not be attained unless the sizes of many national health workforces were dramatically 
increased.  As major themes in this phase, we review the research on programs to increase the 
supply of health workers to underserved areas in developed countries and studies measuring 
and analyzing international health worker migration. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the three perspectives on health workers.  In separate 
subchapters below, we describe the health policy backgrounds that gave rise to each of the 
perspectives and then review relevant literature.  The three perspectives are of course highly 
stylized; the backgrounds are reductionist descriptions of much richer policy contexts; and 
the periods overlap.  However, the perspectives serve useful purposes in this subchapter in 
framing past research, structuring our exposition, and laying out a research agenda on the 








Table 1: Three perspectives on the health workforce 
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II.  First phase: Health workforce planning 
II.1  Background 
Three historical backgrounds gave rise to health workforce planning studies in the 1960s and 
1970s.  First, in the two decades many developed and developing countries experienced 
shortages of health workers, such as nurses (Aurousseau, 1971; Baaij, 1961; Boval, 1966; 
Bureau, 1960; Charokopou, 1966; "[Finland has a nursing shortage]," 1973; Hale, 1964; 
Hanada, 1968; Harer, 1965; Nevo, 1972; "The nursing shortage," 1967; Petursdottir, 1970; 
Salling, 1978; Shambaugh, 1965; Sorensen, 1974; Stokes, 1970; "[Suggestion for alleviation 
of nursing shortage in Tokyo]," 1971; Voval, 1966; Wallace, 1964), midwives (Aoki, 1968; 
Burslem, 1979; Hirosawa, 1968; Keto, 1971; Munch, 1973; Valvanne, 1971), physicians in 
general (Coffey, 1961; Cohen, 1968; Engel, 1964; Estes, 1968; Flynn, 1973; A. L. Frank, 
1971; Gerber, 1967; Ginzberg, 1966; Guerra, 1965; Kadaner, 1965; "The medical manpower 
shortage," 1971; Nevanlinna, 1966; O'Flanagan, 1972; Portes, 1966; Sriratanaban, 1974; 
"Village, household distribution of contraceptives helps Asian nations overcome doctor 
shortage," 1976; "WHO assistance to meet critical shortage of health personnel training for 
doctors, nurses and health workers," 1966), certain types of physicians (C. P. Cooper, 1973; 
Ganguli, 1977; Hargreaves, 1969; Jarvis, 1977; Keen & Thambiran, 1971; Knesper, 1978; 
Pardes, 1979; Sandison, 1979; "Shortage of anaesthetists," 1977; "Shortage of radiologists," 
1966; Wyatt & Cross, 1966), dentists (G. A. Holmes, 1967; Holzinger, 1966; Maleh, 1966; 
Mehta, 1968; Rogers, 1972; Tateishi, Takeuchi, Tanabe, Yasuu, & Sakakibara, 1971), 
paramedical personnel (Jaffurs, 1972; Smith, 1968), pharmacists (Kuyvenhoven, 1960; 
Ogunyemi, 1971), physical therapists (LaViolette, 1979; Millward, 1961), or laboratory 
technicians (Oakley, 1964; Trinkler, 1966).  These shortages demonstrated the insufficiency 
of existing systems to ensure adequate health worker supplies and led to the conclusion that 
“[h]ealth manpower is not a commodity whose production can be left to the imperfect 
functioning of laissez-faire market mechanisms” (Hall & Mejia, 1978).   
Second, reports from socialist countries, such as the USSR, asserted that health manpower 
planning could produce valid projections of future health workforce requirements, aiding 
policy makers in designing workforce policies to ensure sufficient supplies of health workers 
(Daniels, 1974; Popov, 1971).  Third, WHO identified a number of technical difficulties that 
policy makers would inevitably face in ensuring adequate future supplies of health workers 
both in developing and developed countries (Hall & Mejia, 1978). 7 
 
“Manpower requires the longest preparatory period of all the health resources and cannot be 
improvised.  It is also subject to a certain inherent inertia, in that the rigidity of the health and 
education systems and the attitudes of health workers do not make for easy mobility or 
conduce to improving geographical and occupational distribution.  Nor can manpower be 
stored or discarded.  If it is to be available at the proper time, it has to be planned for in 
advance in the right amount and type – no more and no less than is needed.  Because they are 
subject to obsolescence, manpower abilities and skills also need to be maintained by means 
of permanent supervision and continuing education.” 
WHO advocated health workforce planning as a method of ensuring a sufficient supply of 
health workers despite these difficulties.  Initially, WHO had defined health workforce 
planning as “the process of estimating the number of persons and the kind of knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes they need to achieve predetermined health targets and ultimately health 
status objectives” (Hornby, Mejia, Ray, & Simeonov, 1976).  The organization envisioned 
that health workforce planners would calculate future health worker requirements through 
mathematical modeling, using detailed data on population projections, disease burdens, 
health services, and capacities of health care facilities and education institutions.  The 
planners would prepare several health workforce scenarios and present them to policy 
makers, who, in turn, would select the best option for implementation.  However, WHO soon 
came to realize that health policy-making did not follow this rational model.   
“What are the lessons to be learned from experience with manpower planning?  Such 
planning is now more concerned with the actual decision-making process and implementation 
of decisions than with manipulation of numbers in forecasting demand and supply … 
Planning efforts are unlikely to be effective if due account is not take of the social, economic, 
and – most important – the political milieu in which they take place” (Hornby et al., 1976).     
“[M]anpower studies or reports of commissions, however, sophisticated, do not necessarily 
lead to the development, much less to the implementation of a plan, or to an integrated 
process of health manpower development unless the necessary social, economic, and political 
conditions and a definite national political will are present” (Hall & Mejia, 1978). 
“In a word, the health manpower planning process came to be recognized in WHO, as it was 
in countries, as being more political and social than mathematical” (Fülöp & Roemer, 1982). 8 
 
The 1978 WHO report Health Manpower Planning: Principles, Methods, Issues (Hall & 
Mejia, 1978) thus broadened the objectives of planning to include implementation plans and 
communication strategies and emphasized the importance of the “political dimension”, 
“leadership readiness for and commitment to change”, “enabling legislation for planning and 
subsequent plan implementation”, and “administrative capacity and willingness to implement 
the plan” (Hall & Mejia, 1978). 
II.2  Literature 
While the focus of health workforce planning thus moved away from mathematical modeling 
towards management and policy-making, the initial emphasis on estimation led to the 
development of the four main approaches – still used today
2 – to plan national or regional 
health workforce requirements: the need, demand, service targets, and population ratio 
approach (see Table 2 for an overview).  The approaches differ in their scientific stance, 
which, in turn, determines the type of information that is taken into account in the planning 
effort.  The need approach takes a normative stance.  Experts use epidemiological 
information to estimate the future occurrence of disease cases in a population.  The number 
and types of health workers necessary to provide the services to adequately treat all disease 
cases are then calculated, using information on the amount of health worker time required to 
provide certain services.  In contrast, the demand approach takes a positive stance.  Future 
demand for health services is predicted from current demand by assuming that the 
relationships between demand and its determinants (such as population size and income) will 
remain unchanged while the level of the determinants changes.  Predicted health service 
demand is then translated into human resource requirements.   
The service targets approach usually takes a normative stance but, unlike the need approach, 
allows for constraints to the provision of health care in calculating future service 
requirements.  Such constraints include health care capacity and technology on the supply 
side and ability and willingness to pay for health care on the demand side.  Finally, the 
population ratio approach can either take a normative or a positive stance.  Future health 
worker requirements are predicted using population growth predictions and health worker-to-
population ratios derived from studies or deliberations among policy makers. 
                                                            
2 These approaches are defined well in the 1978 WHO book on health manpower planning by Hall and Mejia 
(Hall & Mejia, 1978).  More recent reviews used similar categorizations of planning approaches (Dreesch, 
Dolea, Dal Poz, Goubarev, Adams, Aregawi et al., 2005; Markham & Birch, 1997; Murphy, 2002; O'Brien-
Pallas, Baumann, Donner, Murphy, Lochhaas-Gerlach, & Luba, 2001). 9 
 
The need, demand, and service targets approach require the calculation of health services 
requirements as a step preceding the estimation of health worker requirements.  Since the 
need and the service targets approach are normative, they are likely to stimulate the study of 
health worker productivity, such as analyses of the types and combinations of health workers 
that can produce desired numbers of health services most efficiently.  In contrast, the demand 
approach does not motivate the study of health worker productivity, because it takes current 
modes of health services delivery as given, and the population ratio approach does not require 
a translation of health services into health human resources requirements and thus adds little 
information to the study of health worker productivity.   
The difference between projected health worker requirements and the current supply of health 
workers is likely to be largest if the need approach is used for projection because – unlike the 
other approaches – the need approach neither takes account of a country’s current level of 
health care provision nor considers a country’s capacity to deliver health care.  As a result, in 
many developing countries the needed number of health workers substantially exceeds the 
current supply of health workers (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004; WHO, 2006b).  In contrast, 
in developed countries the needed health worker numbers may be significantly lower than the 
number of currently available workers, either because health service demand exceeds need or 
a country has produced more health workers than necessary to satisfy either need or demand 
(R. A. Cooper, 2004; R. A. Cooper, Getzen, & Laud, 2003).
3    
Both the need and the service targets approach require that health policy makers can 
effectively control the health care sector in order to ensure that the health workers in a 
country do indeed provide the services that have been determined to be needed and do not 
provide unneeded services demanded by consumers.  In contrast, as Hall and Mejia write, 
studies following the demand approach “have the greatest applicability in countries … in 
which the government plays a relatively passive role in relation to health sector development 




3 Two general observations explain why health worker need and status quo are likely to differ in opposite 
directions in developing and developed countries.  First, health care need decreases with income (Deaton, 2003; 




Table 2: Four approaches to health workforce planning 
Approach Need  Demand  Service  targets  Population  ratio 










4 (All)  health  needs 
should and can be 
met 





of specific priority 
health services 
can be achieved 







can be identified 
 
Data requirements  High 
 
High Low  to  high  Low 
Health worker 
requirements derived 
from health services 
projections 
 
Yes Yes Yes No 




Yes No  Yes No 
Expected difference 
between projections and 
status quo* 
 
Large  Small   Intermediate  Small or large 




High Low High Low  or  high 
 
First approach to estimating health workforce requirements: need 
A good example of an analysis following the need approach to estimating health workforce 
requirements is a 1972 study by Schönfeld, Heston and Falk calculating the numbers of 
physicians required for primary medical care in the United States (US) (Schönfeld, Heston, & 
Falk, 1972).  Schönfeld and colleagues used data from the National Center for Health 
Statistics to predict the annual numbers of cases of different diseases requiring attention by 
two categories of primary care physicians (pediatricians and internists).  They then calculated 
                                                            
4 Sources: (Dreesch et al., 2005; Hall & Mejia, 1978; Murphy, 2002). 11 
 
the total number of pediatrician and internist hours needed to adequately treat all disease 
cases using treatment norms based on health worker opinion.   
“For this specific study, the basic clinical data for number of services and time per unit of 
service have been accumulated from 617 interviews with physicians, expressing the 
judgments of 24 pediatricians and 55 internists regarding what should be done to provide 
good care in each of 80 diseases occurring in children and 170 diseases of adults” (Schönfeld 
et al., 1972). 
Finally, in order to estimate health worker need, the authors divided the total pediatrician 
hours required in one year by the average number of hours a pediatrician works per year 
(2,227 in the period 1965 to 1967) and the total internist hours by the average number of 
hours an internist works per year (2,198).  The study concluded that 133 primary care 
physicians were needed per 100,000 persons, while only about half that number were 
available at the time (Schönfeld et al., 1972). 
Other applications of the need to approach to estimating health worker requirements in the 
US include the Lee-Jones report of 1933 (Lee & Jones, 1933) and the “adjusted needs-based 
model” developed by the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee 
(GMENAC) of 1980 (Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee 
(GMENAC), 1980).  In the period 1960-1980, the need approach to estimating health worker 
requirements was further applied in the USSR (Minstriy of Health, 1967), in Latin America 
(Center for Development Studies (CENDES), 1965), and in Sri Lanka (Hall & Mejia, 1978).  
A recent example of a study following the need approach is an analysis by Birch and 
colleagues who estimated the need for registered nurses in the Atlantic Region of Canada 
(Birch, Kephart, Tomblin-Murphy, O'Brien-Pallas, Alder, & MacKenzie, 2007). 
The need approach is appealing to health workers because it is clearly rooted in the sciences 
of epidemiology and medicine and its underlying ethic of health care is often embraced by 
the health care professions (Bodenheimer & Grumbach, 2002; Cookson & Dolan, 2000) – 
health care should be provided according to need and independently of other characteristics 
of individual patients .  However, the approach has been criticized on conceptual and 
practical grounds.  Conceptually, as Klarman (1969) points out, “[w]hether need is a 
desirable standard hinges on society’s willingness to accord an absolute priority to health 
services, regardless of cost” (Klarman, 1969).  Some modifications of the need approach take 
this criticism into account.  In some studies, only those diseases whose treatments met certain 12 
 
cost-benefit criteria were taken into account in planning (Hall & Mejia, 1978).  Practically, 
the morbidity data for need projection may not be available in many countries or may be 
measured with considerable uncertainty.  In addition, the need approach may not be robust 
across geographical areas, practice settings, or time periods.  For instance, Schönfeld, Heston, 
and Falk cautioned against generalization of their study findings because  
“the interviewed physicians of this study are mainly in solo or limited partnership practice in 
one geographical area (New Haven, Connecticut), and their opinions apply to only one point 
in time – the present.  It may therefore be necessary to have these current views and the 
derivative standards of what constitutes good care reviewed by physicians in other parts of 
the country and in other types of practices” (Schönfeld et al., 1972).  
The results from the GMENAC study could not be replicated in a later study when treatment 
norms were developed through analysis of visit records in three large health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) or by a Delphi panel of pediatricians belonging to the three HMOS 
instead of by the national panel of pediatricians used in the original study (Weiner, 
Steinwachs, Shapiro, Coltin, Ershoff, & Connor, 1987).   The analyses of visit records 
obtained from the HMOs Maxicare, Med Centers Health Plan, and Harvard Community 
Health Plan yielded estimated numbers of pediatricians that were 59%, 84%, and 92% of the 
GMENAC estimate, respectively.  The Delphi panel of pediatricians from these three HMOs 
yielded estimated numbers that were 39%, 48%, and 33% of the GMENAC estimate, 
respectively. 
Moreover, even if data and methods allowed valid estimation of health worker requirements 
according to health need and a country had sufficient resources and the political will to 
provide all the required health workers, it would be unlikely that health care would be 
provided exactly according to policy plans.  Patients may not demand needed health services 
and may demand unneeded ones; health workers may not supply needed services and may 
supply unneeded ones (Murphy, 2002).  Finally, since the treatment norms used in the need 
approach are based on current medical practice, the approach may inhibit innovation in the 
delivery of health care.  In many cases, current medical practice may be replaced by 
alternative means of delivery, e.g., by substituting one type of health worker with another or 
by increasing the use of medical information technology.  
In sum, the need approach may only be feasible in situations where detailed data on disease 
prevalence and incidence are available, the health sector can draw on adequate resources to 13 
 
fund needed health workers, and the strength of sectoral control is such that it can be assured 
that most utilized health care is needed.  In such settings, health policy makers should 
undertake careful sensitivity analyses of health worker requirements in order to assess how 
much estimates will change if expert opinion or health care technology changes.  
Second approach to estimating health workforce requirements: demand 
An example of an analysis following the demand approach is a 1975 study by Hall, Reinke 
and Lawrence on health workforce requirements in Chile (Hall, Reinke, & Lawrence, 1975).  
The researchers first estimated in regression analyses the effects of geographical location, 
income, sex, age, insurance coverage, and education on three measures of health care demand 
(doctor visits, dentist visits, hospital nights).  They then used predictions of the independent 
variables to estimate future demand for health services (10 years and 20 years after 1968, the 
year for which the equations were estimated).  Finally, they converted predicted demand into 
health worker requirements, using estimates of productivity and staffing patterns of hospitals 
and facilities providing ambulatory and dental care, which were based on field observation 
and expert opinion (Hall, 1971). 
Other health manpower studies employing a demand approach include Baker and Pearlman’s 
1967 study on Taiwan (Baker & Perlman, 1967), Fein’s 1967 study on the US (Fein, 1967), 
and Hall’s 1969 study on Peru (Hall, 1969).  Recent examples are a study predicting the 
demand for accident and emergency services in the UK (Chambers & Johnson, 1986) and a 
2008 WHO study projecting the global demand for physicians (Scheffler, Liu, Kinfu, & Dal 
Poz, 2008). 
Whether the predictive nature of the demand approach is an advantage or a disadvantage will 
depend on the intended use of the estimated health worker requirements.  In situations in 
which policy makers intend to merely adjust the status quo of health services delivery to 
changes in a few factors that are outside their control (such as population size and 
composition, economic growth, or migration) demand studies may provide sufficient 
information about future health worker requirements.  Demand studies may also provide 
baseline estimates for further normative analyses in countries where the government intends 
to significantly change the pattern of health care utilization. 
While demand studies could thus inform health policy in many circumstances, they are often 
not feasible because the data necessary to estimate demand functions are lacking (Dreesch et 14 
 
al., 2005).  In addition, demand-based studies may not yield reliable estimates of future health 
worker requirements.  First, they commonly do not take into account (as, for example, the 
studies mentioned above) that demand and supply are simultaneously determined.  Estimates 
of health worker requirements that do not account for the interaction between demand and 
supply in the health care market are thus likely to be biased.  Research on health worker 
requirements following the demand approach may benefit from increased use economic 
models of health care demand (Benham, 1971; M. S. Feldstein, 1967, 1971).  Second, 
demand-based studies usually assume that the relationships between demand and its 
determinants will remain unchanged in the future, an assumption that is likely to be violated 
in many situations.  Third, they assume that projections of the development of the 
determinants of health care demand are reasonably accurate.  This assumption may not hold 
true; for instance, per-capita income may not rise to predicted levels because of an 
unexpected economic crisis.  Fourth, they may wrongly assume generalizability of findings 
from the particular setting of one study to other settings.  For instance, one of the 
determinants commonly taken into account in demand-based studies is income.  However, 
estimates of the income elasticity of health care demand in microeconomic studies (which are 
often used for demand-based forecasting (Hall & Mejia, 1978; Klarman, 1969, 1973)) vary 
widely, even if they cover similar geographic areas and time periods, suggesting that these 
estimates are quite uncertain (see, for instance, (R. Anderson & Benham, 1970; Fein, 1967; P. 
J. Feldstein, 1964; Gorham, 1967; Newhouse & Phelps, 1976; Rosett & Huang, 1973; Silver, 
1970; Stigler, 1956)).  In sum, studies of health worker requirements following the demand 
approach can be useful in certain situations.  In many other situations, however, they may not 
provide the information required to plan and implement future health policies, may provide 
the required information only with considerable uncertainty, or may not be feasible to 
conduct at all. 
Third approach to estimating health workforce requirements: service targets 
Hall and Mejia (Hall & Mejia, 1978) describe an example of a study deriving health worker 
requirements from service targets.  Colombian health planners first identified “priority 
services” for a population of nine million people lacking access to basic health care, based on 
“morbidity surveys carried out earlier, the accumulated experience of pilot simplified 
medicine programmes, statistics on service utilization, referral rates, and international 
experience”.  The planners then calculated the numbers of different types of health workers 15 
 
(health promoters and nurse auxiliaries working in communities and physicians and support 
staff working at health posts and in hospitals), using “normative techniques”.  Many of the 
more recent examples of estimations of health worker requirements follow a service target 
approach.  For instance, Kurowski, Wyss, Abdulla and Mills (Kurowski & Mills, 2006; 
Kurowski, Wyss, Abdulla, & Mills, 2007) estimated the numbers of health workers required 
to deliver 33 “priority interventions” identified by the Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health as important to achieving the MDGs (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 
2001; Working Group 5 of the Commission on Macroecnomics and Health, 2002).   Based on 
WHO guidelines, the researchers broke the interventions down into tasks requiring different 
levels of health worker skill.  Next, they measured the time needed to complete the different 
tasks through structured interviews with randomly selected health workers in Tanzania.  
Then, they estimated through a time and motion study (Robbins, Bergman, Stagg, & Coulter, 
2003) the proportion of health worker time spent providing health care (staff productivity) 
and the proportion of productive staff time spent providing the selected priority interventions 
(service productivity).  Finally, the researchers estimated the numbers of nurses, midwives, 
physicians, and technicians necessary to provide the “priority interventions” in Tanzania 
under three productivity scenarios (assuming that staff and service productivity remained 
unchanged, deteriorated, or improved).  Dreesch and colleagues (Dreesch et al., 2005) 
proposed a similar method to estimate the health workforce required to achieve the MDGs.  
First, they selected priority interventions, taking into account “incidence and prevalence of 
health problems, demographic characteristics of the population, and (internationally) the 
targets set forth by the MDGs, or (at country level) targets identified in health sector strategic 
plans”.  Next, they identified in functional job analysis (F. I. Moore, 1999) the tasks required 
to deliver the interventions.  Then, they estimated the time required to complete the tasks 
based on observation (Hurst, 2002) or expert opinion.  Finally, they considered whether 
required times per task could be reduced by improving productivity through task 
reorganization.   
As these examples demonstrate, the main differences between the two normative planning 
approaches (the service targets and the need approach) are in the scope of health care 
considered and in the constraints taken into account.  The service targets approach decides on 
priority interventions, taking into account health care need but also (explicitly or implicitly) 
existing constraints to meeting that need; in contrast, the need approach starts by identifying 
health care need and assumes that all need can be met.  The former approach will thus yield 16 
 
more realistic human resources requirements than the latter.  The service targets approach has 
the further advantages that it explicitly disaggregates need into different components, is easy 
to communicate, can be easily combined with other planning approaches, and facilitates the 
study of health worker productivity (Hall & Mejia, 1978).  Moreover, unlike the need and the 
demand approach, the service targets approach does not depend on detailed local data to yield 
useful estimates of health workforce requirements.  
On the other hand, just like the needs approach, the service targets approach has the 
disadvantage that it assumes that consumers demand and health workers provide precisely 
those services that the planners have used to derive health worker requirements.  In most 
settings, however, the overlap between the health services consumed and those planned will 
be imperfect.  The health services approach will be most useful in countries where the 
government can exert substantial control over health services and is willing to use this power 
to maximize delivery of planned services and minimize delivery of unplanned ones.  
Fourth approach to estimating health workforce requirements: population ratio 
Health worker-to-population ratios have been frequently used in planning manpower 
requirements.  For instance, following a WHO recommendation Thailand aimed at achieving 
a physician-to-population ratio of 1:5000 in the period 1972-1976 (Chunharas, 1998).   
Bahrain tried to attain a physician-to-population ratio of 1:650 in the period 1998-2005 
(Ahmed, Fateha, & Benjamin, 2000).  In the 1993 World Development Report, the World 
Bank stated that “[t]he public health and minimum essential clinical interventions require 
about 0.1 physician per 1,000 population and between 2 and 4 graduate nurses per physician” 
(World Bank, 1993); and in the 2006 World Health Report, WHO identified a “needs-based 
sufficiency” threshold of 2.5 health workers per 1,000 population (WHO, 2006b): 
“To achieve a global assessment of shortfall, the Joint Learning Initiative (JLI), a network of 
global health leaders, launched by the Rockefeller Foundation, suggested that, on average, 
countries with fewer than 2.5 health care professionals (counting only doctors, nurses and 
midwives) per 1,000 population failed to achieve an 80% coverage rate for deliveries by 
skilled birth attendants or for measles immunization.” 
“This method of defining a shortage, whether global or by country, is driven partly by the 
decision to set the minimum desired level of coverage at 80% and partly by the empirical 
identification of health worker density associated with that level of coverage. Using a similar 17 
 
“threshold” method and updated information on the size of the health workforce obtained for 
this report, the JLI analysis has been repeated for skilled birth attendants .. . A remarkably 
similar threshold is found at 2.28 health care professionals per 1000 population, ranging from 
2.02 to 2.54 allowing for uncertainty. The 57 countries that fall below this threshold and 
which fail to attain the 80% coverage level are defined as having a critical shortage.” 
The popularity of the population ratio approach to health workforce planning stems from the 
ease and flexibility of its use.  The data to estimate current health worker-to-population ratios 
are available in most countries worldwide for some time periods, and ratio objectives are easy 
to communicate to policy makers and planners.  On the other hand, the approach suffers from 
many limitations.  First, population ratios are necessarily averages across geographical 
regions, subregions of which may have ratios that differ widely from the averages.  For 
instance, Bennet, Hall, Lutwana and Rado in a study in 1965 found an overall physician-to-
population ratio of 1:18,500 in Kenya, Uganda, and the then Tanganyika.  This average, 
however, could be decomposed into an average ratio of 1:4,400 for urban areas and an 
average ratio of 1:31,000 for rural areas where more than 90% of the population lived 
(Bennett, Hall, Lutwana, & Rado, 1965).  Figure 1 shows the quotients of urban nurse-to-
population ratios divided by the rural nurse-to-population ratios for country-years for which 
these data were available in the WHO Global Atlas of the Health Workforce (WHO, 2009); 
Figure 2 shows the urban-to-rural quotients for physicians based on the same data source.
5  
The two figures show large differences between health worker population ratios in urban and 
rural areas in most countries for which data were available, suggesting that for many planning 
purposes pooled rural-urban averages will not be sufficiently disaggregated.
6    
Second, unlike the other three health worker planning approaches, the population ratio 
approach does not require an intermediary step of estimating health services in order to 
calculate the health worker numbers.  It is thus the approach that will be least likely to lead to 
a focus on health worker productivity in planning future worker requirements.  Third, the 
                                                            
5 The graphs show the ratios for all country-years for which data were available in the WHO Global Atlas of the 
Health Workforce with one exception.  We do not show the urban-to-rural ratio for physicians for Bhutan 2004.  
Because the ratio is quite large (599), the differences between the other ratios in the graphs would have been 
difficult to discern, had we included it in the display. 
6 Note that while the WHO Global Atlas is the most reliable dataset on health worker population ratios available 
(Anand & Bärnighausen, 2004), it cannot be ruled out that the differences health worker population ratios 
between urban and rural areas shown in the two figures can be partially explained by differences in data sources 
and data definitions (such as definitions of physicians and nurses or rural and urban areas) (WHO, 2009).  
However, it is unlikely that improved adjustment for these differences would alter the conclusion that rural-to-
urban health worker population ratios vary widely across countries. 18 
 
approach does not explain which factors drive health worker requirements, except for 
changes in crude population size.  Thus, the population ratio approach to health workforce 
planning is mainly useful for international comparison and as a first indicator of a country’s 
overall health human resources situation (Bossert, Bärnighausen, Bowser, Mitchell, & Gedik, 
2007), rather than as the main planning tool to estimate health worker requirements. 
Figure 1: Quotients of urban nurse-to-population ratios divided by rural nurse-to-






































































Figure 2: Quotients of urban physician-to-population ratios divided by rural physician-











































































III.  Second phase: The health worker as economic actor 
III.1  Background 
Starting in the 1970s and continuing in the 1980s and 1990s, policy makers in developed 
countries became increasingly worried about rising health expenditures (Altman & Levitt, 
2002; Boccuti & Moon, 2003; R.G. Evans, Barer, & Hertzman, 1991; Gray, 1998).  The 
average annual growth rate of health care expenditure in real terms for 18 countries belonging 
to the OECD was 3.0% in the period 1980-1990 and 3.3% in the period 1990-2001(Huber & 
Orosz, 2003).
7  Health care expenditures throughout the developed world rose in terms of 
both per-capita spending on health (Huber, 1999; Huber & Orosz, 2003; Martin, Whittle, & 
Levit, 2001; Schieber, Poullier, & Greenwald, 1993, 1994) and the proportion of per-capita 
gross domestic product (Huber, 1999; Huber & Orosz, 2003; Schieber et al., 1993, 1994).
8   
 
At the same time, the apparent health worker shortage of the past period gave way to a 
perceived oversupply (O. Adams, 1989; Budetti, 1981; Bui, 1986; Charatan, 1996; Ellwood 
& Ellwein, 1981; Ginzberg, 1983; Grayson, 1978; "HEW advisers eye physician 
'oversupply'," 1980; Hosokawa & Roberts, 1982; Macleish, 1985; Menken, 1981; Menken & 
Sheps, 1984; "Most medical staffs have an oversupply of specialists, but don't plan to take 
action to correct this," 1995; Placone & Wallace, 1982; Riska, 1995; Sabiston, 1984; Salmon 
& Culbertson, 1985; Schroeder, 1984; Selby, 1981; Tierney, Waters, & Williams, 1980; 
Whitcomb, 1995; M. S. White & Culbertson, 1981; R. I. White, 1992; Yager, 1987).
9  The 
focus of research on health workers thus shifted from planning for future supplies to 
investigating the extent to which health workers contribute to increases in health expenditures 
                                                            
7 In this study, health care spending was adjusted for inflation using the gross domestic product deflator (Huber 
& Orosz, 2003). 
8 While most macroeconomic studies of the income elasticity of health care expenditure estimated values greater 
than unity (Gerdtham & Jonsson, 1991; Gerdtham, Sogaard, Anderson, & Jonsson, 1992; Hitiris, 1997; Hitiris 
& Posnett, 1992; Milne & Molana, 1991; Newhouse, 1977), the estimates vary substantially and some studies 
find income elasticities smaller than unity (Parkin, McGuire, & Yule, 1987; Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 1993).  
Reasons for the divergent results include difference in datasets, econometric models, and approaches to 
adjusting for purchasing power in studies with cross-country data (Okunade & Suraratdecha, 2000). 
9 Claims of health worker shortages or oversupplies imply that quantity standards for health workers have been 
set.  Such quantity standards are difficult to determine and usually quite uncertain (Ginzberg, 1983), as 
described in the preceding subchapter on health worker planning, making it difficult to validate claims of 
shortages or oversupplies.  For the argument in this background section, however, it is unimportant whether 
such claims are valid.  We merely need to show that policy makers and researchers perceived an oversupply of 
health workers where previously they had perceived a shortage.  21 
 
and whether changes in the administration of health workers can help contain costs (Carrin & 
Hanvoravongchai, 2003; Mehrotra, Dudley, & Luft, 2003; Stone, 1997).  Health workers 
came to be seen as profit-maximizing economic actors individually and as rent-seeking 
professional groups collectively.  Much of the research in this phase was motivated by the 
belief that health workers do not always act in their patients’ best interest, exploiting market 
failures in health care for their own gain and reducing social welfare in the process.  In health 
economics research, this belief was exemplified by the intensive study of supplier-induced 
demand, defined by McGuire in the Handbook of Health Economics (McGuire, 2000) as 
follows:  
 
“Supplier induced demand exists when the physician influences a patient’s demand for care 
against the physician’s interpretation of the best interest of the patient.”   
 
In commentaries in health policy journals, the belief was expressed more blatantly.  “Is the 
health workforce a barrier to cost containment?” asks Montoya in The American Journal of 
Managed Care (Montoya, 2000) and as Aaron writes in Health Affairs (Aaron, 2002) 
 
“Hospital wings echoed with unoccupied beds.  Doctors’ garages were filled with Mercedes 
Benzes.  And employers were reeling under rising health care premium costs.”  
 
While the view of health workers as profit-maximizing economic actors was narrow 
(neglecting, for instance, the influence of such factors as altruism and professional ethics in 
guiding the actions of nurses and doctors (Le Grand, 1997)),
10 the rigorous application of 
microeconomic theory to health worker behavior was fruitful, leading to important insights 
on a range of topics, such as competition among providers, health worker licensure, 
information asymmetry and health worker agency (Blomqvist, 1991), health worker 
performance and productivity (Cutler & Berndt, 2001), provider payment and incentives 
(Sloan & Kasper, 2008), and medical decision making.  As described in the introduction 
section, other chapters in this handbook are devoted to many of these topics (chapters 26, 27, 
29, 30, 31, and 33).  In the literature review in this subchapter, we thus cover only one topic, 
health worker licensure, which is not discussed in detail elsewhere in this book. 
                                                            
10 Many recent economic models of health worker behavior take a more differentiated view of factors explaining 
health worker behavior (Encinosa, Gaynor, & Rebitzer, 2007; R. G. Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007; Olbrich, 2008; 
Schneider & Ulrich, 2008).   22 
 
III.2  Health worker licensure  
Health worker licensure, i.e., the authorization of health workers to practice their profession, 
has existed since the medieval period (Garcia-Ballester, McVaugh, & Rubio-Vela, 1989; 
Loewy, 1989).
11  Over time it has become increasingly structured and standardized (Rowe & 
Garcia-Barbero, 2005).  Today, licensure of health workers has been introduced into national 
or subnational legislation in many countries worldwide (see, for instance, (Gaumer, 1984; 
Graddy, 1991a; Muzondo & Pazderka, 1980; Rowe & Garcia-Barbero, 2005; The Licentiate 
Committee of the Medical Council of Hong Kong, 2008; WHO, 2006a)).  In order to obtain a 
health worker license, candidates must have completed formal training in a recognized health 
care education institution and must usually meet further requirements such as completion of 
practical training (e.g., an internship), passage of licensure examinations, proof of absence of 
a criminal record, and swearing of a professional oath (such as the Hippocratic oath or the 
oath of Geneva).  Licensing may be exercised by the Ministry of Health or by independent 
professional bodies, such as a chamber, order, college or council (Rowe & Garcia-Barbero, 
2005).  Clearly specified conditions (for instance, malpractice or substance use) can lead to 
revocation of a health worker license.   
Theories of licensure 
There are two families of theories to explain the existence and specific patterns of legislation, 
including health worker licensure (T. G. Moore, 1961; Noether, 1986; Paul, 1984; Posner, 
1974).  According to “public interest” theories policy makers supply regulation in response to 
the demand of the public for the correction of a market failure.  According to “interest group” 
theories, on the other hand, policy makers supply regulation in response to the demands of 
interest groups trying to increase the incomes of their members (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971).  The two families of theories offer different explanations for the existence of health 
worker licensure and lead to different predictions regarding licensure effects.   
 
                                                            
11 Licensure has to be distinguished from two other types of state regulation of professions, certification and 
registration (Gaumer, 1984).  Certification restricts the use of a particular occupational title to individuals 
meeting specified requirements, but does not bar individuals who do not meet the requirements from practice in 
the occupation.  Registration simply requires that certain information on a health worker (such as name, address, 
and place of occupational training) is recorded by a state agency. 
 23 
 
a.  “Public interest” theories 
A common version of the “public interest” explanation for the existence of licensure is “the 
belief that the public interest will be best served if the poorly trained, incompetent, and 
unethical people are kept from practicing”, because such exclusions will increase the average 
quality of health services (Gaumer, 1984).   This version is not motivated by an economic 
model of behavior.  Arrow (Arrow, 1963) developed a “public interest” theory of licensure, 
which rests on the assumption that health workers know their own abilities – and the more 
capable health workers have higher-paying alternative opportunities for employment.  
Because patients cannot easily judge the quality of individual health workers, the price of a 
health service does not differ by health worker and reflects the average quality of the service 
in the market – i.e., a setup analogous to the one in Akerlof’s classic analysis of “The market 
for ‘lemons’” (Akerlof, 1970). 
Health workers with above-average ability withdraw from this market because their 
alternative employment opportunities provide them with higher incomes.  The withdrawal 
lowers the average quality of health workers and the prices of health services fall, causing 
those among the remaining workers whose abilities exceed the new average ability to exit the 
market.  This process repeats itself until only the least capable health workers are left to 
supply health services.  In this analysis, the market fails because of informational asymmetry 
between health workers and consumers of health services.  Searching out information to 
overcome this asymmetry may be more expensive for the individual consumer than the 
expected gain in welfare (Leland, 1979).  Consumers may find it costly to obtain information 
on health worker quality because most people consume the services of a particular health 
worker only rarely and the outcome of health care may not be observable for a long time after 
service delivery and may depend on factors other than health worker quality (Henderson, 
McQuire, & Mooney, 1987).  In this situation, licensure may serve as a less expensive means 
of reducing the informational asymmetry between health worker and consumer by screening 
out those workers who do not meet defined minimum quality standards – in Arrow’s words  
“[t]he general uncertainty about the prospects of medical treatment is socially handled by 
rigid entry requirements” (Arrow, 1963).    
However, if the only purpose of licensure is to reduce information asymmetry between health 
workers and consumers, certification – which, unlike licensure, does not exclude anyone 
from practicing as a health worker – should serve that purpose at least equally well without 24 
 
reducing consumer choice.  While licensure excludes low-quality health workers from 
professional practice, certification informs consumers about the relative quality of health 
workers.  Several authors have thus argued that the selection of health worker licensure over 
certification is evidence that health worker interests dominate the public interest in the 
regulation of health care (Friedman, 1962; Leffler, 1978; Leland, 1979; T. G. Moore, 1961).  
Against this argument, Svorny (Svorny, 1987) holds that licensure is more effective than 
certification in ensuring that health workers provide high-quality care because, unlike loss of 
licensure, loss of certification does not prevent health workers from practicing altogether.  A 
health worker who loses certification (which she may regain) may have to reduce the prices 
of her services, but will still be able to earn an income providing health care.  In contrast, a 
health worker who loses her license permanently forfeits the entire premium stream derived 
from the investment in career-specific training.
12  Compared to loss of certification, 
revocation of licensure should lead to a larger loss of expected net present value (of the future 
returns on health care education) and thus serve as a stronger incentive against providing low-
quality health care than certification. 
b.  “Interest group” theories 
“Interest group” explanations for the existence of health worker licensure originate in the 
belief that licensure has been introduced in response to the demands of interest groups aiming 
to ensure through licensure that incumbent health workers earn economic rents (Friedman, 
1962; Kessel, 1958, 1970; Rayack, 1967).  Peltzman (Peltzman, 1976) developed a formal 
model of the influence of interest groups on regulation (such as licensure legislation), based 
on a study by Stigler (Stigler, 1971).  According to the model, self-interested legislators 
maximize the expected number of votes in their favor 
   ·         ·  , 
where   is the number of potential voters belonging to the interest group that is set to benefit 
from the regulation,   is the average probability that a member of the interest group will vote 
for the legislator,   is the total number of potential voters, and   is the average probability 
that a member of the group which incurs a loss due to the legislation (every non- ) votes 
against the legislator (Peltzman, 1976).  In this model, the probability of a supportive vote 
                                                            
12 Investment in career-specific training includes tuition, living expenses during schooling, and the opportunity 
cost of time attaining a health care education. 25 
 
from the beneficiary group ( ) is a function of the net benefit per interest group member   
which, in turn, is a function the total dollar amount transferred to the beneficiary group ( ), 
the total amount of dollars spent by the group to mitigate opposition ( ), and the cost of 
organizing the beneficiary group to support the legislator and to mitigate opposition (    ) 
  
           
 
 . 
The legislator chooses the size of the group she will benefit ( ), and offers the group   in 
return for  .  The probability of opposition  , on the other hand, increases with the rate at 
which the income of a member of   is taxed in order to pay for   and decreases with  
  
 
       
 . 
Note that, assuming diminishing returns to the per-capita net benefit, the legislator who 
maximizes   will benefit both   and         to some extent.  Peltzman’s model further 
predicts that the cost of interest group organization      and “imperfect information about 
both the gains and losses of regulatory decisions” restrict the size of the group benefiting 
from the regulation.  Furthermore, “the costs of using the political process” limit the size of 
the gains of the beneficiary group (Peltzman, 1976).
13  Based on the “interest group” theories 
of regulation, we would expect health worker groups to be successful in increasing their rents 
through regulation, because – in comparison to many other occupational groups – they are 
small, well-informed, and well-organized in professional organizations (Friedman, 1962; 
Kessel, 1970; Peltzman, 1989; Stigler, 1971).  
Literature on health worker licensure 
Three categories of health worker licensure studies can be distinguished.  The first category 
examined whether health care markets are competitive or monopolistic.  In this literature, 
monopolistic market structures are taken as evidence that licensure has benefited health 
                                                            
13 Using a setup similar to Peltzman’s, Becker (Becker, 1983) developed another version of an “interest group” 
theory of regulation in order to investigate the effect of deadweight loss on the size of the gain that the 
beneficiary group can achieve through the regulatory process.  The deadweight loss is the difference between 
the gains of the beneficiary group and the losses of the public due to regulation.  Becker’s model predicted that 
deadweight loss is a constraint on the gains of the beneficiary group.  Because deadweight loss increased at an 
increasing rate as regulation moves output away from the efficient level, the beneficiary group would need to 
exert increasing marginal pressure in order to overcome opposition to the regulation.  The model further 
predicted that deadweight loss motivates a search for greater efficiency in regulatory redistribution because 
neither the beneficiary nor the loser group opposes changes that eliminate some deadweight loss.   26 
 
workers and hurt consumers.  The second category of licensure studies analyzed the effects of 
changes in licensure regulation on health worker incomes or on the quantity, price, or quality 
of health services.  Studies in this category infer from relationships between these outcomes 
and the stringency of licensure requirements whether “interest group” or “public interest” 
explanations of licensure hold true.  The third category of studies investigated whether the 
political power of health worker interest groups is a determinant of licensure legislation.  A 
positive relationship between interest group power and licensure legislation is taken as 
evidence that the interests of health workers have dominated those of consumers in 
influencing licensure legislation.  Below, we describe the analytical approaches that have 
been employed in each of the three categories.  For each approach, we review the findings of 
studies and critically discuss the evidence on reasons for the existence of health worker 
licensure.    
a.  First category of licensure studies: market structure 
One approach to determining the level of competitiveness in the health care market has been 
to estimate the return to health worker education and to compare it to the returns to education 
in other occupations.  Studies employing this approach generally found significant positive 
returns to medical education.  However, depending on the time period of observation, the 
particular physician specialties, the comparison occupations, and the estimation technique, 
the estimated returns to education varied widely (Burstein & Cromwell, 1985; Friedman & 
Kuznet, 1945; Leffler, 1978; Leffler & Lindsay, 1980; Lindsay, 1973; Marder & Willke, 
1991; Maurizi, 1975; Weeks, Wallace, Wallace, & Welch, 1994; Wilkinson, 1966).  
Moreover, a number of estimation problems were identified in these studies.  First, the results 
were sensitive to the choice of discount rate and there is no consensus as to which discount 
rate to use to estimate returns to medical education (Leffler, 1978).  Second, the studies 
commonly failed to take into account progressive taxation (Leffler, 1978) and the cost of 
malpractice insurance. Third, many of the earlier studies of return to medical education did 
not control for differences in hours worked across occupations (Lindsay, 1973).  Where 
physicians earn more but work longer hours than comparison occupations, adjustment for 
hours worked reduces cross-occupation differences in rates of return.  Newer studies took this 
criticism into account.  Burstein and Cromwell (1985) found hours-adjusted internal rates of 
return (IRR) to education for all physicians of about 12 percent in 1980 (Burstein & 
Cromwell, 1985); Marder and Willke estimate hours adjusted IRRs to vary across specialty 27 
 
between about 2 percent for Pediatrics to 58 percent for Pathology (Marder & Willke, 1991); 
and Weeks and colleagues calculated hours adjusted IRRs of about 16 percent for primary 
care physicians and 21 percent for specialist physicians, while the comparison occupations 
received similar or higher returns on their education (dentists: 21 percent; attorneys: 25 
percent; business people: 29 percent) (Weeks et al., 1994).  Thus, studies since 1985 that 
calculated hours-adjusted IRR suggest that for many medical specialties the stringent 
licensure requirements did not led to excessive returns. 
Another approach to assess whether health care markets are competitive or monopolistic has 
been to investigate the relationship between physician density per population and the price of 
physician services.  A positive association between density and price was interpreted as 
evidence of a monopolistic market (Newhouse, 1970) or as evidence that physicians induce 
demand for their services (Cromwell & Mitchell, 1986; R. G. Evans, Parish, & Sully, 1973; 
Fuchs, 1978; Tussing & Wojtowycz, 1986).  However, as Sloan and Feldman (Sloan & 
Feldman, 1978) and Newhouse (Newhouse, 1978) pointed out, the inability to control for 
differences in quality of physician services in these studies rendered their results of little 
explanatory value.   
“Recall that analysis of a competitive market assumes a fixed and homogeneous product.  But 
physicians in areas with greater concentration of physicians spend more time with their 
patients and patients in such areas spend less time waiting for their physicians.  More time 
with the physicians and less waiting time are both desirable characteristics that lead to more 
physician time per visit.  In a competitive market, visits using more physician time would be 
more expensive.  As a result, even if the market were competitive, there could be a positive 
relationship between the physician/population ratio and the price of a (non-homogeneous) 
physician visit” (Newhouse, 1978). 
A third approach has been to estimate an index of market power based on comparison of 
marginal revenue to marginal cost in the health services industry (Bresnahan, 1982; Panzar & 
Rosse, 1987).  Wong (Wong, 1996) did not find evidence that the marginal revenue exceeds 
marginal costs in the market for physician services in the US, while Seldon, Jung and 
Cavazos (Seldon, Jung, & Cavazos, 1998) observed that the price for physician services was 
maintained above marginal costs.  The results regarding physician market power from studies 
following this approach are thus inconclusive. 28 
 
In sum, the studies in this category do not provide decisive evidence for monopolistic 
structures in health care markets.  Moreover, none of the studies took consumer benefits into 
account.  It is possible that consumers are better off in a less competitive market than in a 
more competitive one.
14  For instance, licensure legislation may restrict entry of health 
workers into the market and at the same time improve the quality of health care.  If the 
outward shift in demand caused by the latter effect exceeds the inward shift in supply caused 
by the former, consumer welfare will increase.  Even if the studies in this category had 
provided strong evidence for monopolistic structures in health care markets, this evidence 
would have been insufficient to rule out the possibility that such structures were serving the 
public interest.   
Second category of licensure studies: licensure effects 
A second category of licensure studies has investigated the effects of changes in licensure 
legislation on outcomes in order to establish whether “public interest” or “interest group” 
explanations of licensure hold true.  Outcomes considered in this category of studies included 
health worker incomes and the price, quality and quantity of health services.  A number of 
studies found that health workers’ incomes (G. M. Anderson, Halcoussis, & Lowenberg, 
2000; Friedman & Kuznet, 1945; Leffler, 1978; Muzondo & Pazderka, 1980; W. D. White, 
1978) or the price of health services and products (Benham & Benham, 1975; Shepard, 1978) 
increasd when licensure regulations became stricter.  The studies inferred from the results 
that licensure benefited health workers and not consumers.  Yet, these studies suffer from the 
same fundamental weakness that studies investigating the level of competitiveness in the 
health services market suffer from:  Their results do not rule out that the quality-improving 
effect of licensure legislation has shifted health services demand to such an extent that 
aggregate consumption and consumer welfare increase despite the supply-restricting effect of 
the legislation (Svorny, 1987).  Hence the results cannot be used to determine whether 
licensure legislation benefited the public.  Two other approaches in this category of studies 
are better suited for this purpose.   
                                                            
14 Conversely, lack of evidence of monopolistic structures does not imply that licensure was established to 
protect the public.  As Svorny (1987) points out, “there must have been a one-time gain to practicing physicians 
when restrictions on practice of medicine were imposed.  As in other protected markets, entry may dissipate any 
rents over time.” 29 
 
First, it is theoretically possible to exclude the possibility that health worker licensure 
benefited consumers through analysis the quality of health services.
15  If health services 
quality did not improve in response to licensure regulation, it could be ruled out that the 
legislation benefited the consumers.  (In contrast, if health services quality did improve in 
response to licensure legislation, additional information would be necessary in order to 
determine whether the legislation increased consumer welfare, because the quality 
improvement may or may not have been sufficient in size to compensate for a reduction in 
consumer welfare due to supply-restricting effects of licensure.)   
Three studies investigated the effect of licensure on health service quality.  Carroll and 
Gaston (Carroll & Gaston, 1981) found that some licensure requirements for dentists in the 
US led to a reduction in the quality of dental services; Feldman and Begun (Feldman & 
Begun, 1985) found that licensure legislation in the US increased the quality of optometric 
services; and Haas-Wilson (Haas-Wilson, 1986) did not find any significant effect on 
optometric service quality of four state restrictions on optometric practice which, if violated, 
could have led to revocation of optometric license.  The three studies have thus come to very 
different conclusions regarding the effect of licensure on health care quality.  More 
important, it is highly unlikely that the quality measures used in the three studies captured all, 
or even the most important, dimensions of health services quality.  Carroll and Gaston 
(Carroll & Gaston, 1981) measured quality as waiting time for dental appointments, while 
Feldman and Begun (Feldman & Begun, 1985) measured it as length and thoroughness of eye 
exams, and Haas-Wilson (Haas-Wilson, 1986) measured it as the thoroughness of eye exams.  
The studies thus analyzed the effect of licensure legislation on some specific indicators of 
process quality, while ignoring other quality dimensions (such as outcome quality).  
However, in order to rule out the possibility that health worker licensure legislation benefited 
consumers, information on the effects of licensure on all quality dimensions is necessary. 
Second, analysis of the effect of licensure legislation on equilibrium consumption can be used 
to determine whether consumers benefited from such legislation. If licensure legislation 
caused an outward shift in the demand for health services that is greater than the inward shift 
in supply, equilibrium consumption would have increase and consumers would have 
benefited from the legislation; if, on the other hand, the outward shift in demand were smaller 
                                                            
15 We use the word ‘quality’ here to mean all possible dimensions of heath service quality as well as increases in 
certainty about the level of quality in the market for health services.  30 
 
than the inward shift in supply, equilibrium consumption would have decreases and consumer 
welfare would have been reduced.
16   
Svorny (Svorny, 1987) investigated the effect of two particular medical licensure regulations 
(basic science certification and citizenship) on the consumption of physician services.  She 
found that, controlling for a range of socioeconomic, population, and health system 
characteristics, more stringent licensure requirements in a US state were associated with 
lower numbers of physicians per population in the state, and concluded that “the interests of 
organized medicine dominated those of consumers in influencing the medical regulatory 
supply process” (Svorny, 1987).  Adams, Ekelund and Jackson examined the effect of a range 
of variables capturing the stringency of midwife licensure and other midwifery regulations on 
the consumption of the services of certified nurse-midwives (CNM) (Adams 2003).  They 
found that more stringent midwifery regulations in a US state led to lower consumption of 
midwifery services in the state and concluded that “supply-restricting effects dominated 
quality assurance in the U.S. market for CNM services” (A. F. Adams, Ekelund, & Jackson, 
2003). 
Both studies have technical limitations.  Svorny (Svorny, 1987) assumed that her outcome 
variable, physician population density by US state, was a measure of the quantity of 
physician services consumed in the states.  However, it is plausible that physicians in states 
with lower physician population densities provided on average more services per year than 
physicians in states with higher densities.  The conclusion that licensure decreases 
equilibrium consumption of health services may thus be wrong.  Adams, Ekelund and 
Jackson (A. F. Adams et al., 2003) controlled for endogeneity between their outcome variable 
(the quantity of midwife services) and the licensure and regulation variables using a number 
of instrumental variables.  However, the instrumental variables (hospital charges for an 
uncomplicated vaginal delivery, number of CNM per-capita, physician deliveries as a 
percentage of total deliveries, total population in the state) may be invalid because they are 
likely to have affected the outcome variable through many pathways other than the licensure 
and regulation variables.  The coefficients in the instrumental variable regressions may thus 
be biased.  
                                                            
16 This identification of the net effect of licensure legislation on consumer benefits is possible because we 
assume that such legislation never leads to an outward shift in supply.  If this assumption were not met, 
consumer welfare could decrease when equilibrium consumption increases.  31 
 
In sum, analyses of the licensure effect on health worker income or the price of health 
services cannot determine whether licensure served the public interest.  Analyses of the 
licensure effect on health service quality can theoretically rule out that licensure benefited the 
public, but past studies were not able to demonstrate that licensure was in the public interest 
(and it seems unlikely that future studies will) because of practical difficulties in measuring 
comprehensively all dimensions of health service quality that can be affected by licensure 
legislation.  The most promising approach within the second category of studies is to evaluate 
the licensure effect on the quantity of health services.  The results of the two studies that used 
this approach suggest that licensure reduced social welfare, but technical issues diminish the 
strength of this evidence.    
b.  Third category of licensure studies: political power 
A third category of licensure studies has analyzed the relationship between the political 
power of health worker interest groups and the passage of licensure legislation and other 
occupational regulation.  Variables used to proxy interest group power were found to be 
positively associated with passage of licensure legislation for physicians, nurses, dentists, and 
pharmacists (Stigler, 1971) and physician assistants and psychologists (Graddy, 1991b), as 
well as the stringency of licensure regulation for dentists (Becker, 1986) and the stringency of 
other occupational regulation for optometrists (Begun, Crowe, & Feldman, 1981).  The 
authors of these studies interpreted their results as evidence that “interest group” explanations 
of licensure hold true.  However, it is unclear whether the proxy variables they used really 
measured the political power of health worker interest groups.  For instance, Stigler (Stigler, 
1971) and Becker (Becker, 1986) used the percentage of an occupation living in urban areas 
as a measure of political power.  As Stigler argued, an occupation that is more concentrated 
in cities will be more powerful: “When the occupation organizes a campaign to obtain 
favorable legislation, it incurs expenses in the solicitation of support, and these are higher for 
a diffused occupation than a concentrated one” (Stigler, 1971).  However, the concentration 
of health workers in cities may not matter for the political power of occupations in countries 
where most members of the occupation have access to communication technologies, such as 
mail or telephone, so that political support can be organized independent of physical distance 
between health workers.   
Graddy (Graddy, 1991b) assumed that the political power of health worker groups (physician 
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major professional association” to the total number of employed persons, and Begun, Crowe, 
and Feldman (Begun et al., 1981) assumed that the political power of optometrists increases 
with the ratio of optometrists to their competitors (ophthalmologists and opticians).  
However, political power may decrease in these ratios beyond some point.  Ceteris paribus, 
the ratios increased with group size.  However, as group size increases, the cost of organizing 
political support among group members may rise, reducing the group’s political power 
(Peltzman, 1976): 
“It is not enough for the successful group to recognize its interests; it must organize to 
translate this interest into support for the politician who will implement it.  This means not 
only mobilizing its own vote, but contributing resources to the support of the appropriate 
political party or policy: to finance campaigns, to persuade other voters to support or at least 
not oppose the policy or candidate, perhaps occasionally to bribe those in office.  While there 
may be some economies of scale in this organization of support and neutralization of 
opposition, these must be limited.  The larger the groups that seeks the transfer, the narrower 
the base of the opposition and the greater the per-capita stakes that determine the strength of 
opposition, so lobbying and campaigning costs will rise faster than group size.  The cost of 
overcoming “free riders” will also rise faster than group size.” 
Note also that a number of variables hypothesized to proxy political power of interest groups 
in these studies were found not to be associated with licensure legislation and other regulation 
(for instance “the ratio of the occupation to the total labor force”  in Stigler’s 1971 study 
(Stigler, 1971) and “the percentage of optometrists who belong to their state optometry 
association” and “whether or not the state’s optometry association has a legislative lobbyist” 
in the 1981 study by Begun, Crowe, and Feldman (Begun et al., 1981)).  The absence of 
significant relationships between these variables and occupation regulation suggests that the 
variables either did not measure political power or that certain dimensions of political power 
did not influence occupational regulation. 
Another problem with the above analysis belonging to the third category of licensure studies 
is that they did not control for reverse causality, so that their estimates of the effect of 
political power of interest groups on licensure legislation may be biased.  It seems likely that 
in many cases the introduction of licensure or an increase in licensure stringency will reduce 
the costs of organizing political support and thus strengthen health workers’ political power.  
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chamber or council) and can thus be easily contacted in a political campaign.  In addition, 
licensure defines the scope of practice of different types of health worker groups, ensuring a 
certain level of homogeneity of interests within the groups.  Furthermore, the more stringent 
the licensure requirements, the smaller the size of the group of licensed health workers and 
the easier the political organization of the group. 
In sum, while the literature on the relationship between political power of health worker 
interest groups and licensure suggests that political power does determine licensure 
legislation – i.e., that “interest group” explanations of the existence of licensure hold true – 
the studies in this category suffer from a number of limitations.  In particular, it is unclear 
whether the proxy variables for political power chosen in these studies are valid and the 
analyses failed to control for reverse causality in the relationship between political power and 
professional licensure. 
To sum up, we identify three categories of licensure studies: first, studies examining the level 
of competitiveness in the market for health services; second, studies analyzing the effect of 
changes in licensure legislation on health worker incomes or quantity, price, or quality of 
health services; and third, studies investigating the influence of political power of interest 
groups on the passage of licensure legislation.  While several studies suggest that “interest 
group” explanation of the existence of licensure hold true, the evidence is not conclusive.  
Most of the studies we reviewed merely show that health workers have benefited from 
licensure legislation (studies in the first and second category) or that health worker groups 
have had some influence on licensure legislation (studies in the third category), but fail to 
demonstrate that consumers suffered a welfare loss.  Thus, these studies cannot rule out that 
licensure legislation served the public interest.  The studies of licensure effect on quality or 
quantity of health services are an exception.  A decrease in the quality of health services rules 
out an increase in consumer welfare and an increase (decrease) in the quantity of health 
services consumed implies an increase (decrease) in consumer welfare.  However, the few 
studies that investigated the effect of licensure on the quality or quantity of health services 
suffer from technical limitations in measurement of variables and effect estimation, so the 
evidence – again – is not conclusive.   
An important shortcoming of the literature on health worker licensure is that almost all 
published studies were conducted in the US, even though health worker licensure regulations 
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characteristics that are rarely found in other countries.  Some of these characteristics are 
likely to influence the effect of licensure on market outcomes.  For instance, in the US, health 
workers may already have strong incentives to provide high-quality health services because 
of the high costs associated with health care malpractice suits.  The marginal effect that 
licensure can have on market outcomes may thus be lower in the US compared to settings 
where malpractice suits are less expensive.  Future studies need to investigate causes and 
effects of licensure regulation in other countries.  
Two further criticisms apply to studies in the first and the second category.  First, the real 
effects of licensure may differ from the effects that legislators or interest groups intend to 
achieve.  Changes in licensure regulation are infrequent events.  Legislators and members of 
interest groups will thus have little opportunity to observe the effects of licensure laws and to 
learn from failures.  Hence, inferences about the behavior of actors in the regulatory process 
based on observed effects of regulation (as done in many of the studies discussed above) may 
be invalid.  A case in point is a study on the regulation of physiotherapists in the US.  Sass 
and Nichols (Sass & Nichols, 1996) found “that physical therapists have devoted 
considerable effort to obtain passage of laws that ultimately result in lower wages”.  As an 
explanation of “this seemingly perverse result” the authors consider that physical therapists 
incorrectly believed that the professional regulation would increase their earnings (Sass & 
Nichols, 1996).   
Second, analyses belonging to the first and the second category of licensure studies are 
concerned with structures and outcomes in the market for health services.  Health services, 
however, are merely instruments to attain better health.  It is therefore possible that 
consumers suffered a welfare loss in the market for health services, while overall consumer 
welfare increased.  For instance, licensure regulation may have prevented incompetent health 
workers from providing a health service intended to reduce childhood mortality.  The 
resulting inward shift in supply (due to the exclusion of health workers from the market) may 
have exceeded the outward shift in demand (due to the increase in average quality of the 
service), so that consumers suffered a welfare loss in the market for that health service.  
Nevertheless, more children may have survived (since the fewer children who did receive the 
service received a better service) and overall consumer welfare may thus have increased.  In 
measuring the effect of licensure on social welfare, future studies should thus include the 
value of changes in population health outcomes due to licensure regulation. 35 
 
IV.  Third phase: The health worker as necessary resource 
IV.1 Background 
In the 1990s and 2000s, the lack of health workers became a major research focus in 
developed and developing countries.  In contrast to the first phase (see above), health worker 
shortages in developed countries were local rather than nationwide, occurring in so-called 
medically underserved areas, which were most commonly rural or remote areas but included 
also certain areas in cities where predominantly poor people seek health care.
17  In 2002, 
Brooks and colleagues described health worker maldistribution and the resulting health 
worker shortages in underserved areas in the US (Brooks, Walsh, Mardon, Lewis, & 
Clawson, 2002): 
“While 20% of the population of the United States resides in rural areas, less than 11% of 
physicians practice in rural communities. Despite the fact that the supply of physicians has 
increased over the last 20 years, the percentage of physicians practicing primary care 
specialties has declined. Although the overall number of physicians practicing in rural areas 
has increased, the proportion relative to urban areas continues to decline. In sum, it continues 
to be difficult to attract and retain physicians in rural areas, particularly primary care 
physicians.” 
Six years later, Rabinowitz and colleagues repeated, in essence, Brooks’ problem statement 
(Rabinowitz, Diamond, Markham, & Wortman, 2008):  
“The persistent shortage of physicians in rural areas continues to have a major impact on 
access to care for those living in small communities. Although one of every five Americans 
(20%) lives in a rural area, only 9% of physicians practice there. The scope of this problem is 
substantial, because more than 20 million of the 60 million people residing in rural areas live 
in federally designated Health Professional Shortage Areas (HSPAs). This rural physician 
shortage has existed for more than 80 years, despite the fact that, in general, people living in 
rural areas have a greater need for medical care, being older, sicker, and poorer than their 
nonrural peers. Of greater concern, the future rural physician workforce is likely to decline 
                                                            
17 A medically underserved area is an area where the number of health workers falls below a target.  As 
described in section II., such targets can be based on need, demand, or supply criteria (such as service targets or 
population ratios).  Commonly, a mix of criteria is used in the definition of underserved areas (Bärnighausen & 
Bloom, 2009b). 36 
 
even further, with only 3% of recent medical students planning to practice in small towns and 
rural areas.” 
In developing countries, evidence emerged that the population density of health workers 
affected both population health outcomes (such as child mortality (Anand & Bärnighausen, 
2004)) and health systems outcomes (such as childhood vaccination coverage (Anand & 
Bärnighausen, 2007)), emphasizing the need to increase health worker education and 
retention in developing countries (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004; WHO, 2006b).  In addition, 
with the adoption of the MDGs by national governments and international organizations, 
health became a major focus of development policies.  In particular, the fourth MDG 
(“reduce child mortality”), the fifth MDG (“improve maternal health”), and the sixth MDG 
(“combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases”) emphasized population health 
improvements as primary goals of development (United Nations, 2009).  While these goals 
do not depend on health services delivery alone, they are unlikely to be achieved without 
substantial increases in service coverage in developing countries.  The indicators used to 
monitor the progress towards the health MDGs include health service targets, e.g., the 
proportion of one-year old children immunized against measles (for the fourth MDG), the 
proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (for the fifth MDG), and the 
proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs (for 
the sixth MDG) (United Nations, 2009).  It soon became apparent that such health service 
targets could not be achieved without substantially increasing the health workforce in 
developing countries (Joint Learning Initiative, 2004; WHO, 2006b, 2008).
18  Access to 
antiretroviral treatment (ART) is a case in point.  A number of studies modeling the need for 
health workers to provide universal access to antiretroviral treatment (ART) showed that at 
current health worker education and migration rates in developing countries it is very 
unlikely that sufficient health workers will be available to treat most patients needing ART in 
the foreseeable future (Bärnighausen & Bloom, 2009a; Bärnighausen, Bloom, & Humair, 
2007).  Even at current levels of relatively low ART coverage, many developing countries are 
struggling to find the health workers necessary to further expand coverage (Clark, 2006; 
IOM, 2007; Kober & Van Damme, 2004; MSF, 2007; Ooms, Van Damme, & Temmerman, 
2007).  
                                                            
18 Of course, increases in the efficiency of health care delivery, e.g. through changes in health worker team  
composition and task shifting from more to less highly educated health workers , could decrease the gap 
between current health worker numbers and the numbers required to achieve the health MDGs.  However, it is 
very unlikely that efficiency increases can eliminate the gap (WHO, 2008).  37 
 
The shift in perspective from regarding health workers as economic agents to viewing them 
as a resource necessary to improve population health in underserved areas of developed and 
developing countries led to research on means to increase health worker supplies to such 
areas.  In the following, we review two major topics in this third phase of research on the 
health workforce: first, programs aimed at attracting health workers to underserved areas in 
developed countries; and, second, health worker emigration from developing to developed 
countries (Aiken, Buchan, Sochalski, Nichols, & Powell, 2004).  While the supply of health 
workers to underserved areas and regions is not only a function of health worker movements, 
but also of education rates (Bärnighausen & Bloom, 2009a), studies on health worker 
education are few (Eckhert, 2002) and thus do not warrant a review.   
IV.2 Developed countries: interventions to increase the supply of health workers to 
underserved areas 
Programs to increase the supply of health workers to underserved areas can affect health 
workers in different stages of their careers.  Before the start of training to become a health 
worker, selective admission strategies attempt to increase the number health workers who 
will practice in underserved area by selecting those individuals into health care training who 
– given observable characteristics – are most likely to work in underserved areas after 
graduation.  During training, curricula specific to health needs in underserved areas and 
exposure to practice in such areas attempt to increase graduates’ likelihood of choosing 
underserved practice by specifically preparing them for this type of service.  Lastly, financial-
incentive programs offer scholarships (during training) or loan repayments (after training) in 
return for service in underserved areas (Bärnighausen & Bloom, 2008).  Table 3 shows an 
overview of studies extracted from three recent systematic reviews of four types of programs 
(selective admission to medical school, medical school training for practice in underserved 
areas, residency training for practice in underserved areas (Brooks et al., 2002; Rabinowitz et 
al., 2008), and finanicial-incentive programs for return of service in underserved areas 
(Bärnighausen & Bloom, 2009b)), supplemented by studies identified through additional 
literature searches by the authors of this chapter using the PubMed and Econlit databases.   
We excluded from the overview in Table 3 studies that merely described program results and 
included only those studies that compared outcomes in program participants with outcomes in 
non-participants.  All included studies measured an outcome in either one of two categories: 
provision of care – if the study compared all health workers enrolled in a program to all 
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health workers who at some point took up practice in an underserved area.  Two types of 
retention outcomes can be distinguished: retention in the same underserved area (i.e., a health 
worker leaving a particular underserved area to work in another underserved area counts as 
non-retention) and retention in any underserved (i.e., a health worker leaving a particular 
underserved area to work in another underserved area counts as retention). 
Our extraction and literature searches identified only one study reporting the effect of 
selective admission to medical school without additional medical school training to prepare 
students for practice in underserved areas (Basco, Buchbinder, Duggan, & Wilson, 1998).  
The study found – unsurprisingly – that students attending medical schools with selective 
admission targeting future generalists were significantly more interested in primary care and 
in rural practice than students attending medical schools that did not have such a selective 
admission policy.  Other studies investigated programs that trained (future) health workers 
specifically for practice in underserved areas either during medical school (without or without 
an explicit selective admission policies) or during residency.  These studies found that 
participants in these programs were significantly more likely than non-participants to practice 
in underserved areas (Bowman & Penrod, 1998; Brazeau, Potts, & Hickner, 1990; Fryer, 
Stine, Krugman, & Miyoshi, 1994; Rabinowitz, 1993; Rabinowitz, Diamond, Markham, & 
Hazelwood, 1999b; Rabinowitz, Diamond, Markham, & Paynter, 2001; Smucny, Beatty, 
Grant, Dennison, & Wolff, 2005), to intend to practice in underserved areas (Rosenthal, 
2000), and to remain in the same underserved area (Pathman, Steiner, Jones, & Konrad, 
1999; Rabinowitz, Diamond, Markham, & Rabinowitz, 2005) – with only one exception, 
which did not find any significant difference between participants and non-participants 
(Rabinowitz, Diamond, Hojat, & Hazelwood, 1999a). 
Five of seven studies investigating the effect of participation in financial-incentive programs 
on retention in the same underserved found that participants were significantly less likely to 
remain in the same underserved area (G. M. Holmes, 2004; Pathman, Konrad, King, Taylor, 
& Koch, 2004; Pathman, Konrad, & Ricketts, 1992, 1994a, b), while one study did not report 
a significance level but found substantially lower retention among participants (Singer, 
Davidson, Graham, & Davidson, 1998), and another study did not find a significant 
difference (Jackson, Shannon, Pathman, Mason, & Nemitz, 2003).   
On the other hand, 10 of the 12 studies investigating the effect of financial-incentive 
programs on provision of care or retention in any underserved area found that participants 39 
 
were more likely to provide care to underserved populations (Brooks, Mardon, & Clawson, 
2003; Inoue, Matsumoto, & Sawada, 2007; Matsumoto, Inoue, & Kajii, 2008; Pathman, 
Konrad, King, Spaulding, & Taylor, 2000; Probst, Samuels, Shaw, Hart, & Daly, 2003; 
Rabinowitz, Diamond, Veloski, & Gayle, 2000; Rittenhouse, Fryer, Phillips, Miyoshi, 
Nielsen, Goodman et al., 2008; Xu, Fields, Laine, Veloski, Barzansky, & Martini, 1997a; Xu, 
Veloski, Hojat, Politzer, Rabinowitz, & Rattner, 1997b) and to continue to practice in some 
underserved area (G. M. Holmes, 2004; Pathman et al., 2000) .  These differences were 
shown to be statistically significant in eight of the ten studies (Brooks et al., 2003; G. M. 
Holmes, 2004; Pathman et al., 2000; Probst et al., 2003; Rabinowitz et al., 2000; Rittenhouse 
et al., 2008; Xu et al., 1997a; Xu et al., 1997b), while two studies did not provide the results 
of significance tests (Inoue et al., 2007; Matsumoto et al., 2008) and two other studies 
reported that participants were significantly less likely than non-participants to remain in 
some underserved area (Matsumoto et al., 2008; Pathman et al., 1992). 
In all of the above studies, the (future) health workers chose to participate in a program.  It is 
thus difficult to distinguish whether the finding that program participants are more (or less) 
likely to provide care in underserved areas or to remain in an underserved area is a true effect 
of program participation or merely a selection effect.  Selection issues are particularly 
apparent in the evaluation of programs with selective admission policies.  All of the studies 
evaluating such programs compare participating health care students to their non-
participating peers.  However, such peers are unlikely to be a good counterfactual, because 
they will on average be less likely than the participants to have the characteristic required for 
participation in the program, e.g., rural upbringing or self-declared interest in primary health 
care.  As the selection criterion was likely chosen because it was observed to be positively 
associated with practice in underserved areas, we would expect that observed differences in 
the likelihood to practice in underserved areas between participating and non-participating 
health care students can be (partially) explained by selective admission.   
Indeed, the one study that does not find any significant difference in the provision of care in 
underserved areas between participants and non-participants in a program with selective 
admission (and medical school training for rural practice) controlled for rural upbringing in 
the analysis (Rabinowitz et al., 1999a) – while the program “recruits and selectively admits 
medical school applicants who have grown up in a rural area and intend to practice family 
medicine in rural and underserved areas” (Rabinowitz et al., 1999b).   40 
 
Another study of the same program concludes that “the admission component of the PSAP 
[Physician Shortage Area Program] is the most important reason for its success” (Rabinowitz 
et al., 2001).  Implicit in such a conclusion is the assumption that a large proportion of 
participants would not have studied to become health workers, had they not enrolled in the 
program.  If this assumption were not met, the program would not have increased the supply 
of health workers to underserved areas and could thus not be called a “success”.     
Of the 16 studies of program effect in Table 3, 14 controlled for additional variables in the 
comparison between participants and non-participants, such as sex, age, ethnicity, marital 
status, medical specialty (Bowman & Penrod, 1998; G. M. Holmes, 2004; Pathman et al., 
2000; Pathman et al., 2004; Pathman et al., 1992, 1994b; Probst et al., 2003; Rabinowitz et 
al., 1999a; Rabinowitz et al., 1999b; Rabinowitz et al., 2001; Rabinowitz et al., 2000; 
Rittenhouse et al., 2008; Xu et al., 1997a; Xu et al., 1997b).  However, even those studies that 
control for factors likely to be closely related to care provision and retention in underserved 
areas (such as growing up in an underserved area (Rabinowitz et al., 1999a; Rabinowitz et al., 
2000; Xu et al., 1997a; Xu et al., 1997b) or “strong interest” prior to medical school to 
practice as a doctor in an underserved area (Rabinowitz et al., 2000; Xu et al., 1997b)) cannot 
rule out that participants selected into the program on unobserved characteristics related to 
the preference of working in underserved areas. 
Only one study of program effect attempted to control for selection on unobserved variables 
by using a selection model (G. M. Holmes, 2004).  In order to identify the program effect, the 
study used four medical school characteristics: “historical proportion of graduates 
specializing in primary care”, “quality of the school”, a “tuition index”, and a “public school 
indicator”.  The use of these identifying variables assumes that they influenced selection into 
the program but did not affect the provision of care in underserved areas other than through 
their effect on program participation.  However, the type of medical school that students 
attend is likely to be related not only to the decision to enroll in financial-incentive programs, 
but also – independent of program participation – to the decision to work in underserved 
areas.  For instance, students with strong preferences to work in underserved areas may be 
more likely than their peers with weaker preferences for such care to select medical schools 
with a high “historical proportion” of graduates pursuing careers in primary care, because 
such schools are likely to focus on medical education relevant for underserved areas.  This 
selection may determine work location decisions, independent of any effect the medical 41 
 
school characteristic may have on participation in the programs.  Thus the characteristics may 
not be valid variables to identify program effects.   
In sum, studies evaluating programs aimed at increasing the supply of health workers to 
underserved area find that participants are more likely to provide care for underserved 
population and to remain in underserved areas in the long run (even if not in the same 
underserved area where they were initially placed).  However, because the studies to date 
have not convincingly controlled for selection effects, the evidence to date does not allow the 






Table 3: Studies of programs aimed at increasing the supply of health workers to underserved areas 
Study  Program type   Program  Outcomes  Results 













in primary care and 
rural practice 
Students attending medical schools with selective 
recruitment targeting future generalists were significantly 
more interested in primary care and in rural practice than 
students attending other schools. 




























Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
PSAP participation significantly increased the likelihood 
of a graduate of Jefferson Medical College graduates to 
practice rural primary care (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 2.5, 
p < 0.001) net of rural preceptorship during medical 
school, NHSC participation, sex, expected peak income, 
rural family practice clerkship.  Holding the other factors 
equal rural preceptorship and NHSC participation 
significantly increased the likelihood of rural primary 
practice (aORs 2.4 and 2.6, respectively, both p < 0.001).  43 
 
Study  Program type   Program  Outcomes  Results 










PSAP  Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
PSAP participation was not significantly related to 
practice in rural area, when controlling for “size of 
community raised”, “size of community undergraduate 
college”, “father’s education”, “specialty plans as a 
Freshman”, “senior debt”. 










PSAP  Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
“After 11–16 years, 68% (26/38) of the PSAP graduates 
were still practicing family medicine in the same rural 
area, compared with 46% (25/54) of their non-PSAP peers 












PSAP  Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
“PSAP graduates from the classes of 1978 through 1986 
were approximately four times as likely as non-PSAP 
graduates to practice family medicine (55 percent vs. 13 
percent), to practice in a rural area (39 percent vs. 11 
percent), and to practice in underserved areas (33 percent 
vs. 8 percent). They were approximately 10 times more 
likely to combine a career in family medicine with 
practice in a rural (26 percent vs. 3 percent) or 
underserved (23 percent vs. 2 percent) area.” 44 
 
Study  Program type   Program  Outcomes  Results 










PSAP  Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
“PSAP graduates were much more likely than their non-
PSAP classmates at JMC [Jefferson Medical College] to 
practice in a rural area of the United States (34% vs 11%; 
RR, 3.0), to practice in an underserved area (30% vs 9%; 
RR, 3.2), to practice family medicine (52% vs 13%; RR, 
4.0), and to have combined a career in family practice 
with practice in a rural area (21% vs 2%; RR, 8.5).” 
 














Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
“A greater percentage of former RMED students practiced 
in rural locations [22/86 (26%)] than did non-RMED 
students [95/1,307 (7%)]” (p < 0.0001). 
 













Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
Specialty choice of 
medical school 
graduates 
Program graduates “chose rural practice and primary care 
specialties, especially family practice, more often than did 
their downstate colleagues” (whose medical school did not 
emphasize training for practice in underserved areas). 
















Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
Specialty choice of 
medical school 
graduates 
UCSOM graduates who had participated in SEARCH 
were more likely to have chosen a primary care specialty 
(46.9% vs. 30.6%) and to establish practices in rural 




Study  Program type   Program  Outcomes  Results 
(Pathman et al., 
1999) 
Medical school 
training for rural 
practice 
Residency 
training for rural 
practice 











Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
“Residency rural rotations predicted greater preparedness 
for rural practice (p = .004) and small-town living (p = 
.03) and longer retention (hazard ratio, 0.43, p = .003). 
Extended medical school rural rotations predicted only 
greater preparedness for rural practice (p = .03).” 
“The physicians' sense of preparedness for small-town 
living predicted their retention duration (hazard ratio, 
0.74, p < .0001), whereas their preparedness for rural 
medical practice did not predict their retention duration 
after controlling for preparedness for small-town living 
(hazard ratio, 0.92; p = .27).” 










to practice in 
underserved areas 
Graduates of family medicine residencies with rural 
training tracks were more likely to report that they 
intended to practice in rural communities than graduates 
of “small urban FP [family practice] residencies”, 
“midsize urban FP residencies”, and “all FP residencies” 








All US family 
residency 
programs that 
focus on training 
for rural practice 
Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
A one-month increase in the length of time of required 
rural training increased the proportion of graduates of a 
residency program practicing in rural areas by 0.82 
percent (p < 0.0001) net of “percentage of minority 
residents at program”, “full rural mission at program”, 
“partial rural mission at program”, “percentage of 
population of the state that is nonmetropolitan”, “emphasis 
on rural or OB [obstetrics] fellowship”, “director is rural 
contact person”, “other graduate training programs used at 
site”, “months of obstetrical training”, percentage of 
female residents at program”, “population of program site 
(city or metropolitan)”, “percentage of faculty with rural 
practice experience”, “sponsoring hospital of program is 
public”.  Holding the other factors constant, having a rural 
mission statement increased the proportion of graduates 
practicing in rural areas by 12% (p < 0.0001). 46 
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Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
Participants and former participants were more likely to 
work in a rural area of Japan than non-participants. 






Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
Former participants were about four times more likely to 
work in rural areas than non-participants (12.8%  vs. 3.3% 
in 1994 and 10.7% vs. 2.6% in 2004). 






Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
Retention in any 
underserved area 
Participants were significantly more likely to leave their 
practice of original placement than non-participants 
(adjusted hazard ratio (aHR) 1.98, p = 0.0002), when 
controlling for training in internal medicine and stated 
importance of living in a small community). 
Participants were significantly more likely to leave 
practice in underserved areas than-non participants (aHR 
1.56, p = 0.02), when controlling for training in internal 
medicine and stated importance of living in a small 
community). 






Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
Retention in any 
underserved area 
Compared to non-participants, former participants were 
about three times less likely to remain in the same practice 
(13% vs. 44%, p < 0.001) and about half as likely to 
remain in a non-metropolitan area (24% vs. 52%, p < 
0.001). 










Five years after starting work at a practice site, 
participants were significantly less likely to have remained 
at the site of first practice than non-participants (aOR 
0.41, p = 0.01), when controlling for physician discipline 
(allopath vs. osteopath), physician specialty, initial plans 
to remain in the underserved area, percentage of minority 
patients in the practice, county population, type of county, 
per-capita income in the county, and physician population 
density in the county. 47 
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Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
Former participants were significantly more likely to 
practice in an underserved area ten years after graduating 
from medical school than non-participants (aOR = 3.7, p < 
0.0001, when controlling for age, sex, ethnicity, having 
grown up in an underserved area, family income as a 
child, strong interest in working in underserved areas prior 
to medical school, debt, medical school experience in an 
underserved area, and residency experience in an 
underserved area). 




Provision of care to 
poor patients 
30% of former participants’ patients, but only 19% of non-
participants’ patients, were poor. 






Retention in the 
same community 
health center 
After five years of work in a community health centre, 
36% of participants, but only 17% of non-participants, still 
worked in the same centre. 






Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
“Participation in the NHSC is the only experiential factor 
related to caring for the underserved” (aOR 2.2, 95% CI 
1.6-3.0, when controlling for sex, ethnicity, family income 
when growing up, childhood in inner-city/rural area, 
strong interest in underserved practice prior to medical 
school, clinical experience with the underserved during 
medical school). 48 
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Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
13% of rural primary care physicians, but only 3% of 
suburban and 3% of urban primary care physicians, had 
participated in the program. 






Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
Former participants were significantly more likely to be 
highly engaged in Medicaid
19 inpatient practice than non-
participants (aOR = 1.93 (95% CI 1.18-3.13), when 
controlling for physician’s sex, ethnicity, medical 
specialty, period of graduation from medical school, 
medical education in South Carolina, graduation from a 
non-US medical school). 






Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
 
Participants were less likely to remain in their first 
practice location than non-participants (beta coefficients 
between -0.248 and -0.272 across three graduation cohorts 
(all p < 0.01), when controlling for age, sex, and 
ethnicity). 
Participants were more likely to serve in any underserved 
area than non-participants (beta coefficients between 
0.528 and -0.745 across three graduation cohorts (all p < 
0.01), when controlling for age, sex, and ethnicity). 
(Rittenhouse et 





Provision of care in 
any community 
health center 
Participants were significantly more likely to work in a 
community health centre than non-participants (aOR = 
6.99, p < 0.001, when controlling for sex, year of 
residency completion, private vs. public medical school, 




19 Medicaid is a means-tested health program funded by the US federal government and the states.  It covers health care expenditures of some categories of low-
income individuals, including children, parents, pregnant women, and children with disabilities (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2009). 
20 In the US, “Title VII grants are intended to strengthen the primary care educational infrastructure at medical schools and residency programs and to encourage 
physicians-in-training to pursue careers working with underserved populations” (Rittenhouse et al., 2008). 49 
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Provision of care in 
any underserved area 
 
 
In comparison to non-participants, participants in 
financial-incentive programs were significantly more 
likely to practice in rural areas (33.3% vs. 6.5%, p < 
0.001) and to care for underserved populations (54.1% vs. 
29.4%, p < 0.001). 





















Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
Retention in the first practice site was not significantly 
different between program participants and non-
participants. 50 
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programs for fully 
trained health 
professionals 
Retention in the 
same underserved 
area 
Participants were not significantly more likely to remain at 
their site of first practice than non-participants (aHR 0.75, 
p = 0.080, when controlling for age, sex, medical 









IV.3 Developing countries: health worker emigration  
In the past decade, health worker migration from developing to developed countries has been a 
common topic of editorials (Bundred & Levitt, 2000; Chen & Boufford, 2005; Mullan, 2007; 
Pang, Lansang, & Haines, 2002), policy reports (International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP), 
2006; Joint Learning Initiative, 2004; WHO, 2006b), and scientific publications.  Below, we 
summarize the research on international health worker migration regarding measurement (i.e., 
studies estimating the size of migration flows from developing to developed countries or the 
stock of health workers who have migrated), causes (i.e., studies investigating migration 
reasons), welfare impact (i.e., studies investigating how health worker migration affects social 
welfare in source or recipient countries), and programs and policies (i.e., publications discussing 
potential interventions to reduce migration or minimize any negative consequences of 
international health worker migration). 
Numerous studies have described international migration flows or stocks of in- or out-migrated 
health workers for individual migration source countries (e.g., India , Zimbabwe (Chikanda, 
2005), Ghana (Dovlo & Nyonator, 1999), India (Kaushik, Jaiswal, Shah, & Mahal, 2008), 
Malawi (Zijlstra & Broadhead, 2007), Philippines (Institute of Health Policy and Development 
Studies, 2005)) or from individual recipient countries (e.g., UK (Buchan, 2002; Buchan, 
Baldwin, & Mundo, 2008), USA (Akl, Maroun, Major, Chahoud, & Schunemann, 2007; Akl, 
Mustafa, Bdair, & Schunemann, 2007; Brush, Sochalski, & Berger, 2004), Italy (Chaloff, 2008), 
Canada (Dumont, Zurn, Church, & Le Thi, 2008), New Zealand (Zurn & Dumont, 2008)). While 
data on health worker migration published in these studies is useful to demonstrate the 
magnitude of health worker migration from developing to developed countries, it is insufficient 
for many research purposes.  For one, the country-level data cannot be pooled for multi-country 
analyses, because different studies used different methods to estimate the size of migration flows 
and stocks.  In addition, most of the studies covered only short periods of time.  Finally, some 
studies measured only migration of health workers who graduated from specific institutions or 
regions in a country (e.g., (Zijlstra & Broadhead, 2007)). 
Four different studies have published datasets of stocks of emigrated health workers from a 
number of countries (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008; Hagopian, Thompson, Fordyce, Johnson, & 52 
 
Hart, 2004; Mullan, 2005; OECD, 2005; WHO, 2006b).
21  All of the four datasets used numbers 
of health workers reported in recipient countries in order to estimate the magnitude of emigration 
from source countries.  The stock estimates differ substantially across the datasets (see Table 4).   
These discrepancies are due to several factors, demonstrating some of the difficulties in 
estimating international health worker migration flows.   
First, the four datasets used different sources of information on the numbers of foreign 
physicians in recipient countries.  WHO/OECD (OECD, 2005; WHO, 2006b)  and Clemens and 
Petterson (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008) used national census data, while Mullan (Mullan, 2005) 
and Hagopian and colleagues (Hagopian et al., 2004) used data from health workers’ 
professional organizations.   
Second, in order to estimate emigration stocks the different studies counted health workers in 
different sets of recipient countries – WHO/OECD counted health workers in the UK, US, 
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Portugal; Clemens and Pettersson in the UK, US, 
Australia, Canada, France, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, South Africa; Mullan in the UK, US, 
Australia and Canada; and Hagopian and colleagues in the UK and US.   
Third, the different datasets used different definitions of migrant health workers.  WHO, Mullan, 
and Hagopian and colleagues defined a migrant health worker as one who was trained in another 
country, while Clemens and Pettersson defined a migrant health worker as one born in another 
country.  This distinction is important, because some of the countries with the worldwide lowest 
population densities of health workers (such as Lesotho and Swaziland (WHO, 2009)) do not 
have their own medical school and thus depend on physicians trained in other countries – in 
particular their own citizens – to staff their hospitals and clinics (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008).  
According to the definition of a migrant health worker as one who was trained in another 
country, these countries can never have any emigrated physicians and any physician working in 
these countries will always be an immigrant.  Last, the four datasets estimate stocks of emigrated 




21 The data reported in WHO 2006 (WHO, 2006b) is extracted from OECD 2005 (OECD, 2005). 53 
 
Table 4: Estimates of stocks of physicians who emigrated from selected sub-Saharan 
African countries 
   Study 
    




Mullan 2005  Hagopian et al. 
2004 









South Africa  12136 7363 3734  3788
Nigeria 4261 4856 3921  2281
Ghana 926 1639 NR  515
Ethiopia 335 553 NR  266
Uganda 316 1837 NR  175
Zimbabwe 237 1602 NR  101
Angola 168 2102 NR  NR
Cameroon 109 845 NR  NR
Tanzania 46 1356 NR  NR
Mozambique 22 1334 NR  NR
NR = not reported         
 
One comprehensive dataset provides physician emigration rates for all countries worldwide for 
each year in the period 1991-2004 (Docquier & Bhargava, 2006, 2007).  Figure 3 shows annual 
emigration rates (in % per year) for the year 2004 for all countries in sub-Saharan Africa covered 
in the dataset.  According to the dataset, in 2004 emigration rates exceeded 10% in seventeen 
countries in the region and 20% in eight countries.  Such panel on health worker emigration rates 
is extremely useful for a wide range of analyses, including on the causes and consequences of 
health worker migration.  However, the dataset has a number of limitations.  For one, the 
definition of migrant physician used for different recipient countries in the dataset differed across 
recipient countries (a physicians born in another country, a physician with citizenship in another 
country, and a physician trained in another country) (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008).  Moreover, 
the data on physicians who immigrated to a recipient country was available for all fourteen years 
from 1991 through 2004 for only 4 of the 16 recipient countries across which physician numbers 
were summed to estimate emigration flows from source countries.  For all other recipient 
countries, the authors intra- or extrapolated some country-year values of emigrated physicians. 
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Figure 3: Estimates of health worker emigration rates in sub-Saharan African countries, 
2004 
 



















































The relatively recent arrival of the above datasets and the fact that each suffers from some 
limitations may explain why the literature on causes of health worker migration is largely 
descriptive and the literature on the welfare impact of the migration is small.  Studies on the 
causes of health worker migration investigated reasons for migration decisions through surveys 
of health workers in both source and recipient countries.  In these surveys, health workers 
consistently listed higher earnings in other countries as one of the most important reasons for 
migration plans or past migration (Awases, Gbary, Nyoni, & Chatora, 2004; Chikanda, 2005; 
Luck, Fernandes, & Ferrinho, 2000; Mackintosh, 2003; Martineau, Decker, & Bundred, 2002; 
Nguyen, Ropers, Nderitu, Zuyderduin, Luboga, & Hagopian, 2008).  However, health workers 
also named a number of other factors as influencing their migration decisions, including job 
security, flexible leave policies (Mackintosh, 2003), opportunities for education and training 
(Awases et al., 2004; Mackintosh, 2003; Oman, Moulds, & Usher, 2009),  opportunities for 
promotion (Bach, 2004; Buchan, Parkin, & Sochalski, 2003; Muula & Maseko, 2006), the 
management of health services (Bach, 2004; Chikanda, 2005; Kingma, 2006; Luck et al., 2000), 
workplace safety (in particular the risk of work-related HIV infection (Bossert et al., 2007; 
Institute of Health Policy and Development Studies, 2005; Muula & Maseko, 2006; Palmer, 
2006)), family welfare (Chikanda, 2005; Oman et al., 2009), and country stability (Chikanda, 
2005; Nguyen et al., 2008; Oman et al., 2009).  Non-financial factors appear to be nearly as 
important as earnings differentials in motivating migration, but the patterns of important non-
financial factors differ across countries (Awases et al., 2004).  
Despite a well-developed economics literature on the welfare impact of migration (e.g., (Borjas, 
1995; Goldfarb, Havrylyshyn, & Magnum, 1984; Grubel & Scott, 1966; Kwok & Leland, 
1982)), only a few studies have examined the particular impact of international health worker 
migration on social welfare in source and recipient countries.  Studies in Kenya (Kirigia, Gbary, 
Muthuri, Nyoni, & Seddoh, 2006) and Malawi (Muula, Panulo, & Maseko, 2006) estimated the 
financial loss due emigration of a health workers as the total costs of educating  such a health 
worker (including tuition, study materials, accommodation , and living expenses during primary, 
secondary and tertiary education).  The estimated losses of returns on investment were about half 
a million year-2005 US$ for a doctor in Kenya, more than 300 thousand year-2005 US$ for a 
nurse in Kenya (Kirigia et al., 2006), and between approximately  240 thousand year-2005 US$ 
(when an interest rate of 7% per annum is used) and 26 million year-2005 US$ (when an interest 56 
 
rate of 25% is used) (Muula et al., 2006).  While these financial losses seem large, two studies of 
remittances from emigrated health workers found that the remittances (of Filipino physicians 
(Goldfarb et al., 1984) and Tongan and Samoan nurses (Connell & Brown, 2004)) exceeded the 
initial investment in their human capital, suggesting that in some countries it may pay to train 
health workers for export.    
Another study estimated the social net present value of a financial incentive that pays fully for a 
student’s education as a health worker in return for a few years of service in an ART program in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  The study found that these financial incentives are highly cost-beneficial if 
they are effective in reducing health worker emigration.  For instance, if the only effect of the 
financial incentive were to reduce annual health worker emigration from 12% to 5% for five 
years, the net present value of financing the education of a team of health workers sufficient to 
treat 500 ART patients would be more than 200 thousand year-2000 US$ (Bärnighausen & 
Bloom, 2009a). 
A final set of publications on health worker migration has discusses potential programs and 
policies to reduce emigration of health workers from developing countries or to mitigate negative 
consequences of migration.  Table 5 summarizes the proposed interventions.  Some the programs 
and policies have already been implemented in developing countries (such as compulsory service 
(Reid, 2001) or financial-incentive programs (Ross, 2007) in South Africa or non-financial 
incentives in Zambia (Koot & Martineau, 2005)) or been adopted by developed countries (such 
as the UK’s “ethical recruitment policy” (Carlisle, 2004)).  However, studies evaluating the 
effect of the implemented programs and policies on health worker migration – similar to those 
evaluating programs to increase the supply of health workers to underserved areas in developed 
countries – are as of yet lacking.   
In sum, although the recent focus of development policy on population health has sparked 
research on health worker migration from developing to developed countries, the majority of 
studies are descriptive in nature, in part, because comprehensive data on international migration 
flows of health workers has not been available.  Future initiatives need to emphasize further 
improvements in data on international health worker migration.  Once validated data are 
available, researchers can draw on the extensive literature and theories of migration in economics 57 
 
and other disciplines to further investigate the causes and consequences of health worker 
migration and to evaluate existing interventions to reduce migration rates. 
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Table 5: Programs and policies to reduce health worker migration from developing 




Program or policy  Definition  References 
Microlevel approaches    
Selective admission  Select students for health worker 
education who are likely to remain in the 
country of training 
(Lehmann, Dieleman, & 
Martineau, 2008) 
Training for practice in 
developing countries 
Focus health care education on the health 
care needs of developing countries 
(Lehmann et al., 2008) 
Increased health worker 
training in developed 
countries 
Increase the national health worker 
education rate in countries that currently 
receive large numbers of health workers 
from developing countries 
(Ahmad, 2005) 
Compulsory service  Require all health workers to serve for 
some time in their country of training 
(Metz, 1991; Reid, 2001) 
Financial incentives  Offer financial incentives for return of 
service in the country of training 
(Bärnighausen & Bloom, 2009b; 
Ross, 2007) 
Non-financial incentives  Improve the working and living 
conditions of health workers in 
developing countries 
(Lehmann et al., 2008; Stilwell, 
Diallo, Zurn, Vujicic, Adams, & 
Dal Poz, 2004) 
Macrolevel approaches    
Visa restrictions  Potential recipient countries agree not to 
issue visas to health workers from certain 
potential source countries or to issue only 
temporary visas 
(Ahmad, 2005; Stilwell et al., 
2004) 
“Ethical recruitment”  Potential recipient countries allow 
recruitment of health workers only if the 
source country consents to such 
recruitment 
(Ahmad, 2005; Buchan & 
Sochalski, 2004; Labonte, 
Packer, Klassen, Kazanjian, 
Apland, Adalikwu et al., 2006) 
Compensation payments  Recipient countries make payments to 
certain migration source countries for 
every health workers they receive from 
the source countries 
(Ahmad, 2005; Buchan & 




In this paper, we have reviewed research on the health workforce since the 1960s.  We have 
structured the review into three perspectives corresponding roughly to three chronological 
phases.  During the first phase – which is associated with the perspective “health workforce 
planning” – shortages of health workers in developed countries triggered research on manpower 
planning methods to aid policy makers in ensuring adequate supplies of health workers (1960s 
through 1970s).  Four main approaches to project future health worker requirements were 
developed, viz., approaches based on health need, demand for health care, health care service 
targets, and health worker-to-population ratios.  We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
each of the four approaches and show that modified versions of the approaches, in particular the 
service targets approach, are experiencing a renaissance in current studies estimating health 
worker requirements to meet population health goals, such as the health MDGs, in developing 
countries. 
During the second phase – which is associated with the perspective “the health worker as 
economic actor“ – a perceived “cost explosion” in many health systems in developed countries 
shifted the research focus to the study of the influence of health workers’ behavior on allocative 
and technical efficiency in health systems (1980s through 1990s).  We review the literature on 
one particular research topic during this phase, health worker licensure, which investigated 
whether licensure regulation was introduced to benefit health worker “interest groups” or to 
serve the “public interest”.  We describe three categories of studies testing “interest group” 
against “public interest” explanations of the existence of health worker licensure.  Studies in the 
first category, “market structure”, measured the level of competitiveness in the health care 
market, taking competitive structures as evidence against and monopolistic structures as 
evidence for “interest group” explanations; studies in the second category, “licensure effects”, 
examined the influence of licensure on health worker incomes, and the price, quality, and 
quantity of health services; studies in the third category, “political power”, analyzed the 
relationship between the political power of health worker interest groups and the passage of 
licensure legislation.  While the findings of several studies suggest that “interest group” 
explanation of the existence of licensure hold true, the evidence is not conclusive because of 
technical limitations and conceptual problems in the analytical approaches.   60 
 
During the third phase – which is associated with the perspective “the health worker as necessary 
resource” – local health worker shortages in developed countries and regional shortages in 
developing countries sparked research investigating the effectiveness of interventions to increase 
the supply of health workers to so-called underserved areas of developed countries and health 
worker migration from developing to developed countries (1990s through 2000s).  Several 
studies showed that participants in programs aimed at increasing the number of health workers in 
underserved areas (such as selective admission to health worker education or financial-incentives 
for return of service) were more likely to provide care in such areas than their peers who did not 
participate. However, the studies could not conclude that the programs caused an increase in the 
supply of health workers to underserved areas, because they cannot rule out that selection rather 
than program effects was responsible for the differences in the behavior between program 
participants and non-participants.  International health worker migration has recently emerged as 
a research topic (including studies on the causes and consequences of such migration), but has 
been hampered by the lack of validated data on health worker migration flows and stocks of 
migrated health workers.   
Of course, the three research perspectives on the global health workforce are merely stylized 
descriptions of main research thrusts and do not imply that such foci were necessarily the best 
use of research resources during the different phases.  Moreover, the three perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive.  For instance, some of the studies undertaken from a perspective of the 
health worker as a necessary resource use health workforce planning approaches to estimate the 
size of the gap between available and needed health workers – even if the starting point of these 
studies is an observed health worker constraint in the delivery of certain priority health 
interventions.  Other studies that are motivated by a perceived or measured lack of health 
workers clearly view health workers as economic actors that consider financial and non-financial 
incentives in their location decisions.    
Opportunities for future research on the health workforce abound.  While they are likely to 
include new approaches to the study, our review suggests that the transfer of existing approaches 
from developed to developing countries could lead to important insights.  For instance, studies 
on health worker licensure were mostly carried out in the US.  It seems likely that the strength of 
health worker “interest groups” relative to the power of the public differs across stages of 61 
 
socioeconomic development and by type of health system.  Evidence on the causes and effects of 
health worker licensure in different developing countries is thus likely to contribute substantially 
to the licensure debate.  Another example where transfer of research topics and methods could 
lead to important insights is programs to influence health workers’ location decisions.  Programs 
similar to those aimed at increasing the supply of health workers to underserved areas in 
developed countries have been implemented in many developing countries.  Unlike their 
developed-country counterparts, however, they have yet to be evaluated in their impact on health 
worker movements from well-served to underserved areas and from developing to developed 
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